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Asset pricing under optimal contracts ∗
Jaksˇa Cvitanic´†, Hao Xing‡
October 9, 2017
Abstract. We consider the problem of finding equilibrium asset prices in a financial market in
which a portfolio manager (Agent) invests on behalf of an investor (Principal), who compensates
the manager with an optimal contract. We extend a model from Buffa, Vayanos and Woolley
(2014) by allowing general contracts, and by allowing the portfolio manager to invest privately
in individual risky assets or the index. To alleviate the effect of moral hazard, Agent is optimally
compensated by benchmarking to the index, which, however, may incentivize him to be too much
of a “closet indexer”. To counter those incentives, the optimal contract rewards Agent for taking
specific risk of individual assets in excess of the systematic risk of the index, by rewarding the
deviation between the portfolio return and the return of an index portfolio, and the deviation’s
quadratic variation.
Keywords: asset-management, equilibrium asset pricing, optimal contracts, principal–agent prob-
lem.
2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: 91B40, 93E20
JEL classification: C61, C73, D82, J33, M52
1 Introduction
We consider the problem of asset pricing with delegated portfolio management, that is, of finding
asset prices so that the financial market is in equilibrium when the portfolio managers are offered
optimal compensation contracts. The fact that an increasing percentage of investment funds is run
by investment managers underlines the importance of studying the effect of managerial actions
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on asset prices. Thus, the problem is important, however, it is also difficult. There are exten-
sive studies that consider various equilibrium models of asset prices, but, partly due to technical
difficulties, there are almost no results where asset pricing is combined with optimal contracting
between portfolio managers and investors. A notable exception is [Buffa et al., 2014], henceforth
BVW (2014), which inspired the current paper.1
BVW (2014) considers a market with three types of participants: portfolio managers who de-
cide on the investment strategy, but who can also get benefit from (non contractible) shirking that
reduces the managed return; rational investors who can hire managers to invest on investors behalf
in individual assets, while investors invest privately only in the index; and buy-and-hold investors.
Portfolio managers have expert knowledge about individual assets, which is why investors can ben-
efit from contracting managers to get access to individual assets. Both the investor and the portfolio
manager have CARA utility functions. BVW (2014) considers two models: one in which the div-
idends have square-root dynamics, and the other in which they have OU (Orstein-Uhlenbeck) dy-
namics. The representative CARA investor chooses optimally the contract to pay the representative
manager, but is allowed to do so only in a subfamily of all possible contracts – those that are linear
in the investor’s portfolio value and the stock index. This would, indeed, be optimal in the classical
moral hazard continuous-time models of [Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987] and [Sannikov, 2008],
in which the manager can only affect the return of the output process. However, when the manager
can also affect the volatility of the output, as is the case in portfolio management, it was shown
in [Cvitanic´ et al., 2016a] and [Cvitanic´ et al., 2016b], henceforth CPT (2016ab), that the optimal
contract makes use also of the quadratic (co)variations of the contractible factors. We use that
insight to extend the family of admissible contracts in this paper.
The differences between this paper and CPT (2016ab) are as follows. In the latter, the manager
is paid only once, at the final time, and the model is one of partial equilibrium, that is, the asset
prices are exogenous. In contrast, in this paper the manager is paid at a continuous rate on an
infinite horizon, and the asset prices are determined endogenously in equilibrium, as in BVW
(2014). We use a mathematical methodology similar to that of CPT (2016ab), but adapted to
the infinite horizon and continuous payments. In our setting, as in CPT (2016ab), the optimal
contract uses quadratic (co)variations of contractible variables. More precisely, in the OU model,
the optimal contract is linear in the investor’s portfolio value, the index, and the quadratic variation
of the deviation of the portfolio return from the return of an index portfolio. We find that the
contract sensitivity to the quadratic variation of the deviation is positive, meaning that the contract
rewards the agent for taking specific risk of individual risky assets beyond the systematic risk of the
index. We show in a numerical example that the contract with the quadratic variation component
can substantially increase investor’s optimal value.
To the best of our knowledge, this, together with Leung (2016), is the first general equilib-
1Other related literature is discussed below.
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rium model in which such a contract is shown to be optimal. The use of the quadratic variation,
which, in practice, would correspond to using the sample variance, is, as noted in CPT (2016a),
in the spirit of using the sample Sharpe ratio when compensating portfolio managers. However,
in our model, in equilibrium, the principal rewards the agent for higher values of the quadratic
variation, rather than penalizing him, to provide proper incentives for risk-taking beyond solely
taking the risk of the index. The helpfulness of the second order variations is in agreement with
[Admati and Pfleiderer, 1997] who emphasized that linear benchmark contracts may be inefficient
for providing the right incentives. It is also consistent with [Bhattacharaya and Pfleiderer, 1985]
who pointed out that quadratic contracts could be helpful in improving the incentives (albeit in the
context of adverse selection rather than moral hazard).2
Let us elaborate further on the need for a contract which benchmarks to an index fund. In the
first best risk sharing between two CARA agents with risk aversions ρ and ρ¯ , the fraction ρρ+ρ¯
of the output is paid to the agent with risk aversion ρ¯ . However, in the model of BVW (2014),
the portfolio manager can apply a non-contractible shirking action, resulting in agency friction.
To prevent the shirking action, the investor has to offer the pay-per-performance fraction Z that
is higher than the shirking benefit b. Thus, when b > ρρ+ρ¯ , the investor cannot offer the first best
compensation. However, the higher than the first best fraction, Z ≥ b, exposes the manager to
higher risk. It then becomes profitable for the investor to reduce that exposure by benchmarking
the output to the index. In turn, the benchmarking may make the manager invest too much in the
index risk, and not enough in the specific risks of individual assets. This makes the investor use
quadratic variation terms in the contract to reward the portfolio manager for taking specific risks.
When the contract depends only on the fraction of the output, Merton’s theory of optimal
portfolio selection would imply that the optimal investment into risky assets would be implemented
via one fund only, call it Merton’s fund, which is the fund with the vector of holdings equal to the
risk premium vector. However, with a term depending on the index returns also in the contract,
the manager would also like to invest in a second fund, the index. The Merton’s fund is not
equal to the index fund in our model because we assume that some shares are not available for
trading. When the agency friction is more severe, the manager puts more weight on the index
fund. Thus, the managed fund in this case is a “closet indexer”. Our finding is consistent with the
empirical analysis of [Cremers and Petajisto, 2009] which argued that the “closet indexers” are
disproportionately expensive, relative to their performance.3
We also extend the model in BVW(2014) by allowing the portfolio manager to invest privately
in individual risky assets. When the manager can trade in all the individual assets privately, the
managed fund under the optimal contract is simply the index fund. Given that the investor can
invest in the index directly, in this case the investor does not benefit from contracting. When the
manager is allowed to trade privately only in the index, the second best can still be obtained with
2We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out to us the relevance of these two references.
3We are in debt to an anonymous referee for pointing out this connection to us.
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a contract that incentivizes the manager to report his private portfolio value truthfully.
We leave the square-root model for dividends for future research. The difficulty with the
square-root model is that the linear contracts with constant coefficients (the admissible contracts in
BVW (2016)) are time-inconsistent – the investor would optimally want to change the coefficients
as the time goes by. This makes the problem non-stationary and difficult.
Our asset pricing results are similar to those of the OU case in BVW (2014): the stocks in large
supply have high risk premia, and the stocks in low supply have low risk premia, and this effect
is stronger as agency friction increases. However, by using the contract that provides optimal
risk-taking incentives, the sensitivity of the price distortion to agency frictions is of an order of
magnitude smaller compared to the price distortion in BVW (2014). In other words, by including
the risk-incentive terms in the compensation, the investor mitigates somewhat the effect of agency
frictions in equilibrium.
Other than BVW (2014), Leung (2016), and the current paper, most of the existing litera-
ture either looks at the case of a fixed contract and then finds asset prices in equilibrium, or
the case of fixed asset prices and then finds the optimal contract. In the first strand of the lit-
erature with fixed contracts, none of the papers, other than the current one and Leung (2016),
allows for quadratic variation and co-variation components in the contract. That literature in-
cludes the following papers (a more thorough literature review can be found in BVW 2014):
[Brennan, 1993] considers a static model with preferences based on a benchmark, resulting in
a two-factor equilibrium model; [Basak and Pavlova, 2013] consider a similar set-up, but in a dy-
namic model; [Cuoco and Kaniel, 2011] have a dynamic setting with two risky assets, and the
contract is a piece-wise affine function of the portfolio return and the return relative to a bench-
mark; [Malamud and Petrov, 2014] consider two types of managers, less and more informed.
The second strand of the literature with fixed asset prices includes the following papers:
[Ou-Yang, 2003] has a dynamic model in which the portfolio value is only observable at the ter-
minal time, and in which there is no moral hazard due to shirking, so that the optimal contract
does not have quadratic variation/covariation components; [Cadenillas et al., 2007] extend some of
[Ou-Yang, 2003] results to non-CARA utility functions, still with no moral hazard; [Lioui and Poncet, 2013]
assume that the agent has enough bargaining power to require that the contract be linear in the out-
put and in a benchmark factor; [Leung, 2014] studies a model with a single risky asset, in which
moral hazard arises because there is an exogenous factor multiplying the volatility choice of the
agent, and that factor is not observed by the principal; CPT (2016ab) find the optimal contract
when the primary source of moral hazard is not due to shirking, but to the volatility vector being
unobserved and the agent’s cost of modifying it. Their model has finite horizon T and the agent is
paid with a lump-sum contract payment at T only, unlike the present paper in which the payments
are continuous over an infinite horizon.
Papers that do combine asset pricing and contracting include the following. [Ou-Yang, 2005]
studies the interaction of asset pricing and moral hazard. However, the managers in his model are
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not portfolio managers, they are managers of firms, and they affect only the return rate of the firms’
cash flows and not their volatilities. Moreover, the compensation payment is not continuous, but a
lump sum at the end of the horizon. [Sung and Wan, 2015] consider an economy with N principals
who hire N agents, extending the [Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987] framework; as in the latter, the
agents again only affect the drift of the cash-flows and the optimal contract depends only on the
returns. In [Kaniel and Kondor, 2013] the authors consider a market with a fraction of investors
delegating their capital for management, while the others invest directly at a cost. They do not look
for the optimal contract; instead, they assume that a flow of capital to the managers is a convex
function of performance, as empirically documented. [Leung, 2016] is an interesting recent paper
that also considers an interplay between the asset price equilibrium and optimal contracting, but
in a different model from ours, in which the manager affects with his effort the dividend growth
rate and not the shirking level (as in our model); more importantly, the returns from the managed
portfolio go to the manager, while the investors receive only the dividends. Despite the model
differences, in his model the optimal contract has a similar form as ours, a linear term, and a term
depending on the quadratic variation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up the model and the optimization
problems, Section 3 describes the main results, Section 4 extends the result to the case when Agent
can invest privately, Section 5 concludes, and Section 6 provides the proofs.
Some notational conventions. Let (Ω,F= {Ft}t≥0,P) denote a filtrated probability space, whose
filtration F is the augmented filtration generated by independent Brownian motions Bp,(Be)i=1,...,N ,
and satisfies the usual conditions of completeness and right-continuity. For a F-adapted process
X , FX denotes the filtration generated by X and satisfies the usual conditions.
2 Model
2.1 Assets
The market consists of a risk-free asset with an exogenous constant risk-free rate r, and N risky
assets whose prices (Sit)i=1,...,N will be determined in equilibrium. We work with the following
model considered by [Buffa et al., 2014], henceforth BVW (2014). Assume that the dividend
process of asset i = 1, . . . ,N is given by
Dit = ai pt + eit , (2.1)
where p and ei follow Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes
d pt = κ p(p¯− pt)dt+σpdBpt ,
deit = κei (e¯i− eit)dt+σeidBeit .
(2.2)
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Here, Bp and (Bei )i=1,...,N are independent Brownian motions, and model coefficients ai, p¯, e¯i,κ
p,κei ,
σp,σei, for i = 1, . . . ,N, are all positive constants. The filtration FB
p,Be , denoted by F, represents
the full information in the model. We introduce the following vector and matrix notation for future
use:
e = diag{e1, . . . ,eN}, e¯ = diag{e¯1, . . . , e¯N}, σe = diag{σe1, . . . ,σeN},
D = (D1, . . . ,DN)′, S = (S1, . . . ,SN)′, κe = (κe1, . . . ,κ
e
N)
′, and Be = (Be1, . . . ,B
e
N)
′,
where diag{a1, . . . ,aN} is a diagonal matrix with diagonal elements a1, . . . ,aN and (·)′ represents
the vector transpose.
The vector of assets’ return per share in excess of the riskless rate follows
dRt = Dtdt+dSt− rStdt. (2.3)
The excess return of the market portfolio, or index, is given by
It = η ′Rt , (2.4)
where η = (η1, . . . ,ηN)′ is a constant vector, with ηi equal to the number of shares of asset i in the
market. However, we assume that not all the shares of assets are available for trade. A constant
vector θ = (θ1, . . . ,θN)′, with entries equal to the number of shares available to trade is called the
residual supply. The difference ηi−θi equals the number of shares of asset i held by buy-and-hold
investors who do not trade. We assume that each component of θ is strictly positive.
2.2 Agent and Principal
In addition to buy-and-hold investors, there are two market participants in the model: Agent (port-
folio manager) and Principal (investor). They can be considered as representatives of identical
agents and principals. Both Agent and Principal are price-takers, that is, they take prices as given,
without taking into account the feedback effects in equilibrium.
Principal can hire Agent to manage a portfolio of assets on Principal’s behalf. Agent, if hired
by Principal, receives compensation (fee) paid by Principal, manages a portfolio of assets, and he
can also undertake a “shirking” action that has a detrimental effect on the portfolio, but it provides
Agent with a private benefit.
In the benchmark model, Agent can only invest in the riskless asset in his private account, and
he can also consume from it. Thus, Agent is exposed to the risky assets only via the compensation
paid by Principal. We consider two additional cases in Section 4, the one in which Agent can
invest privately in all the risky assets, and the one in which he can invest privately only in the
index.
In the benchmark model, Agent’s wealth process is given by
dW¯t = rW¯tdt+(bmt− c¯t)dt+dFt , (2.5)
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where
- c¯t is Agent’s consumption rate;
- bmt is the private benefit from his rate mt of shirking with the benefit rate b ∈ [0,1];
- Ft is the cumulative compensation paid by Principal.
Principal can trade in the index, but not in the individual risky assets. The only way she can
access individual risky assets is by hiring Agent. As noted in BVW (2014), one way to interpret
this participation constraint is that Principal is unable to identify assets that have good return/risk
characteristics relative to the index. This happens when Principal does not observe assets return
vector R. As a result, Principal must employ Agent for non-index investing, because Agent has
private information on individual asset characteristics, and, thus, contracting might be beneficial to
Principal. As for Agent, because he can privately invest only in the riskless asset, the only way for
him to have exposure to risky assets is through the fee paid by Principal. To achieve that exposure,
Agent takes specific risk of individual risky assets in Principal’s portfolio. This in turn provides
benefits to Principal, and both Agent and Principal gain from contracting with each other. When
Agent can invest privately in all the risky assets, we show in Section 4.1 that Agent gets the benefit
of individual risky assets fully through his private investment, and would only invest in the index
for Principal; as a result, there are no gains from contracting. 4
Recall also that in the CARA-normal framework of this paper the investor would split her
capital between the risk-free asset and the fund corresponding to the risk premium vector. How-
ever, due to the presence of buy-and-hold investors, not all the shares are available for trade, and,
therefore, if vector θ of the numbers of available shares in the residue supply is not co-linear with
vector η of the total number of shares, the risk premium vector is not equal to the index fund in
equilibrium. This is why it is suboptimal for Principal to trade only in the index and the risk-free
asset – she has a need for Agent, to gain access to individual risky assets.
Principal’s wealth process follows
dWt = rWtdt+dGt + ytdIt− ctdt−dFt , (2.6)
where:
- Gt =
∫ t
0[Y
′
s dRs−msds] is the reported cumulative fund return process, where Y is the vector
of the number of shares of the risky assets held by Agent in the managed portfolio;
- yt is the number of shares of the index held by Principal;
- ct is Principal’s consumption rate.
Agent’s rate mt of shirking action mt is assumed to be nonnegative. It reduces Principal’s
wealth; in addition to shirking, it can also be interpreted as diverting money from the port-
folio for expenses that do not contribute to the performance of the fund. More generally, it
may be thought of as a measure of (lack of) Agent’s efficiency when running the portfolio; see
[DeMarzo and Sannikov, 2006].
4We thank the AE for pointing this out.
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Agent maximizes utility over intertemporal consumption:
V¯ = max
Ξ admissible
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δ¯ tuA(c¯t)dt
]
,
where uA is exponential utility with constant absolute risk aversion ρ¯ , i.e., uA(c) = − 1ρ¯ e−ρ¯c, and
δ¯ > 0 is Agent’s discounting rate. Given Agent’s utility function uA, we can assume, without loss
of generality, that the initial wealth of Agent is zero, i.e., W¯0 = 0.
Given Principal’s strategy Θ = (c,F,y), Agent’s strategy Ξ = (c¯,m,Y ) is admissible if the
following conditions are satisfied
- (c¯,m,Y ) is adapted to F;
- Y is predictable,
∫ t
0 |Ys|2ds< ∞ for all t > 0;
- m≥ 0;
- c¯ is financed by wealth process W¯ satisfying (2.5).
- The following transversality condition is satisfied:
lim
T→∞
lim
n→∞E
[
e−δ¯ (T∧τn)e−rρ¯W¯
u
T∧τn
]
= 0, (2.7)
for any sequence of stopping time {τn}n with limn τn = ∞.
If Agent is not employed by Principal, he chooses his private portfolio Y u and consumption
rate c¯u to maximize his utility over consumption
V¯ u = max
(Y u,c¯u) admissible
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δ¯ tuA(c¯ut )dt
]
,
subject to the budget constraint
dW¯ ut = rW¯
u
t dt+Y
u
t dRt− c¯ut dt. (2.8)
Agent’s private investment and consumption strategy (Y u, c¯u) is admissible if
- (Y u, c¯u) is adapted to F;
- Y u is predictable,
∫ t
0 |Y us |2ds< ∞ for all t > 0;
- c¯u is financed by wealth process W¯ u satisfying (2.8).
- The transversality condition (2.7) is satisfied.
Agent takes the contract offered by Principal if and only if the following participation con-
straint is satisfied:
V¯ ≥ V¯ u. (2.9)
When this inequality is an equality, Agent is indifferent with respect to taking the contract or not.
In this case, as is standard in contract theory, we assume that Agent chooses to work for Principal.
Principal maximizes utility over intertemporal consumption:
V = max
Θ admissible
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δ tuP(ct)dt
]
,
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where uP is an exponential utility with constant absolute risk aversion ρ , i.e., uP(c) = − 1ρ e−ρc,
and δ > 0 is Principal’s discounting rate. Principal’s strategy Θ= (c,F,y) is admissible if
- Agent’s optimization problem admits at least one admissible optimal strategyΞ∗=(c¯∗,m∗,Y ∗);
- (c,F,y) is adapted to FG∗,I , where G∗t =
∫ t
0(Y
∗
s )
′dRs−m∗s ds is the reported cumulative fund
return when Agent employs his optimal strategy Ξ∗;
- y is predictable,
∫ t
0 y
2
s ds< ∞ for all t ≥ 0;
- The consumption stream c is financed by the wealth process W satisfying
dWt = rWtdt+dG∗t + ytdIt− ctdt−dFt ;
- The following transversality condition is satisfied:
lim
T→∞
lim
n→∞E
[
e−δ (T∧τn)e−rρW
u
T∧τn
]
= 0, (2.10)
for any sequence of stopping time {τn}n with limn τn = ∞.
If Principal does not hire Agent, she chooses investment yu in the index and consumption rate
cu to maximize her utility over consumption
V u = max
(yu,cu) admissible
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δ tup(cut )dt
]
,
subject to the budget constraint
dW ut = rW
u
t dt+ y
u
t dIt− cut dt. (2.11)
Principal’s private investment and consumption strategy (yu,cu) is admissible if
- (yu,cu) is adapted to FI;
- yu is predictable,
∫ t
0 |yus |2ds< ∞ for all t > 0;
- cu is financed by wealth process W u satisfying (2.11).
- The transversality condition (2.10) is satisfied.
Principal hires Agent if and only if
V ≥V u. (2.12)
When the inequality above is an equality, Principal is indifferent to hiring Agent or not. In this
case, we assume that Principal chooses to hire Agent.
2.3 Equilibrium
We will look for equilibria in which Principal hires Agent. The notion of equilibrium is similar to
BVW (2014). The only difference is that the class of the contracts which Principal is allowed to
optimize over is incorporated in our notion of equilibrium.
Definition 2.1 A price process S, a contract F in a class of contractsF , and an index investment
y form an equilibrium if:
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(i) Given S, (F,F ) and y, Agent takes the contract, and Y = θ−yη solves Agent’s optimization
problem.
(ii) Given S, Principal hires Agent, contract F is optimal for Principal in the class F and y is
her optimal index investment strategy.
We will look for the equilibrium in which the price of asset i is of the form
Sit = a0i+api pt +aeieit , (2.13)
where (a0i,api,aei) are constants that will be determined in equilibrium. The form of (2.13),
combined with (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3), imply that the excess return for asset i follows
dRit =[(ai−api(r+κ p))pt +(1−aei(r+κei ))eit +κ papi p¯+κei aeie¯i− ra0i]dt
+apiσpdBpt +aeiσidBeit
= : [A1i pt +A2ieit +A3i]dt+apiσpdB
p
t +aeiσeidBeit . (2.14)
Denote also
γ = (ap1, . . . ,apN)′σp, σ = diag{ae1, . . . ,aeN}σe, A` = (A`1, . . . ,A`N)′, `= 1,2,3,
µt− r = ptA1+ etA2+A3, and ΣR = γγ ′+σ2.
Then, the vector of asset returns follows
dRt = (µt− r)dt+ γ dBpt +σdBet , (2.15)
with (instantaneous) covariance matrix ΣR.
3 Optimal strategies and equilibrium
Since the main new effects in this paper arise from the optimal contract including terms which
depend on quadratic (co)variations of the contractible variables, we first discuss the need for these
terms in the contract, in a market with fixed asset prices.
3.1 Incentive effects of quadratic variations and covariations
Let us first recall that the first best risk sharing between two CARA agents is obtained by paying
the fraction ρρ+ρ¯ of the output G to the agent with risk aversion ρ¯ . This is still the case in our
framework when there is no agency friction. However, when agency friction is present, i.e., Agent
receives benefit at rate b from non-contractible shirking action, if the fraction of the output in
Agent’s compensation is less than b, Agent would apply an infinite level of shirking (i.e., m =
10
∞), which is clearly suboptimal for Principal. Therefore, the pay-per-performance fraction Z in
Agent’s compensation should be no smaller than b. As a result, if b> ρρ+ρ¯ , Principal cannot offer
the first best compensation. However, high pay-per-performance fraction exposes Agent to more
risk. It then becomes profitable for Principal to benchmark the output to the index by offerring a
term UI in the contract, where U is the contract sensitivity of the index.
With only the term ZG in the contract, standard Merton’s theory of optimal portfolio selection
would imply that the optimal investment into risky assets would be implemented via one fund
only, call it Merton’s fund, which is the fund with the vector of holdings equal to the risk premium
vector Σ−1R (µ− r). However, with the term UI also in the contract, Agent would also like to invest
in a second fund, that is, the index, as we illustrate in what follows. Note that Merton’s fund is
the fund Principal would invest into in absence of agency frictions, but it is not equal to the index
fund in our model, due to some shares not being available for trading. This is why Principal needs
access to individual assets via delegation.
One of the main points of this paper is that Principal also should include terms depending on
quadratic (co)variations of the contractible variables in the contract. A reason for this is that in-
cluding the term UI in the contract may make Agent invest too much in the index risk, and not
enough in the specific risk of individual assets, which Principal benefits from. To better understand
the intuition behind the effects of those terms, we first use a simplified framework to compare sim-
ple linear contracts, that do not include those (co)variations, with linear contracts that do include
them.
Assume, for simplicity, that (2.15) holds with constant µt ≡ µ . Suppose first that the contract
is linear only in the portfolio returns and the index returns, that is, of the form,
Ft = ZGt +UIt , (3.1)
for some constants U and Z.
As mentioned above, Principal needs to choose Z ≥ b, and we will show that this will make
Agent choose m ≡ 0. Then, from (2.5), the optimization term involving the choice of strategy Y
in the HJB optimality equation (the dynamic programming equation) for Agent’s value function
V¯ = V¯ (W¯ ) is
sup
Y
{
V¯W¯ ZY
′(µ− r)+ 12V¯W¯W¯ (ZY +Uη)′ΣR(ZY +Uη)
}
, (3.2)
where V¯W¯ and V¯W¯W¯ denote the appropriate partial derivatives. This reflects the familiar mean-
variance tradeoff, with the first term representing the mean of the part of the compensation driven
by the choice of the portfolio strategy Y , and the second term driven by the variance of the com-
pensation. We conjecture that Agent’s value function is of the form V¯ (W¯ ) = V¯0e−rρ¯W¯ for some
constant V¯0 (which will be verified later). If that is the case, we see that Agent will optimally
choose
Y ∗ =
1
rρ¯Z
Σ−1R (µ− r)−
U
Z
η . (3.3)
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Thus, Agent’s strategy is a linear combination of the risk premium vector Σ−1R (µ − r) and the
index, that is, his strategy is a weighted average of two funds. There is no investment in the index
fund if the index fund is not used in the contract, that is, if U = 0. However, note that since Z
is restricted to be not less than b, Principal can place at most weight 1rρ¯b on Merton’s fund. This
restricts the range of strategies attainable under the contracts of the above form.
Suppose now we consider contracts that include the quadratic (co)variations, that is, of the
form, with constants C,Z,U,γG,γ I , and γGI ,
Ft =Ct+ZGt +UIt + 12γ
G〈G〉t + 12γ I〈I〉t ++γGI〈G, I〉t ,5 (3.4)
where the quadratic (co)variations are defined as
d〈G〉t = Y ′ΣRY dt, d〈I〉t = η ′ΣRηdt, and d〈G, I〉t = Y ′ΣRηdt.
The maximization term in Agent’s optimality equation contains now an extra term V¯W¯ (
1
2γ
GY ′ΣRY +
γ IY ′ΣRη) and becomes
sup
Y
{
V¯W¯ ZY
′(µ− r)+V¯W¯ (12γGY ′ΣRY + γGIY ′ΣRη)+ 12V¯W¯W¯ (ZY +Uη)′ΣR(ZY +Uη)
}
. (3.5)
Using the conjectured form of Agent’s value function V¯ (W¯ ) = V¯0e−rρ¯W¯ , we see that Agent will
optimally choose
Y ∗ =
Z
rρ¯Z2− γGΣ
−1
R (µ− r)−
rρ¯ZU− γGI
rρ¯Z2− γG η .
To make Y ∗ above more transparent, we reparameterize (3.4) to
Ft =Ct+ZGt +UIt + 12Γ
G〈G〉t + 12ΓI〈I〉t +ΓGI〈G, I〉t + 12rρ¯〈ZG+UI〉t . (3.6)
Then, the additional term 12rρ¯〈ZG+UI〉t cancels the quadratic term 12V¯W¯W¯ (ZY +Uη)′ΣR(ZY +
Uη) in (3.5), and replaces it with a quadratic term V¯W¯ (12Γ
GY ′ΣRY +ΓGIY ′ΣRη), with arbitrary
weights ΓG and ΓGI . Under the new parametrization, Agent will optimally choose
Y ∗ =− Z
ΓG
Σ−1R (µ− r)−
ΓGI
ΓG
η . (3.7)
Thus, even though Z is no smaller than b, because ΓG is not constrained Principal can achieve
arbitrary weights on Merton’s fund.
Let us conclude this informal discussion by reiterating in which case it would actually be
beneficial for Principal to have the Y ∗ from (3.7) different from the one in (3.3): this is the case if
and only if Principal wants to have a weight of more than 1/(rρ¯b) on Merton’s portfolio, which
is the case if an only if b> ρ/(ρ+ ρ¯), as argued in the beginning of this section. In other words,
if the agency friction, as measured by the shirking benefit b, is high, it is in Principal’s interest
to include quadratic variation and covariation in the contract. In the remainder of the paper, we
develop a rigorous approach for justifying the intuition given in this section, and for placing it in
an equilibrium framework.
5Since Agent cannot control the returns of the index, the term 12γ
I
t 〈I〉t can be incorporated into the term Ct.
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3.2 Family of viable contracts
A priori, we do not know that it is sufficient to consider the contracts of the form (3.6). In par-
ticular, it is not clear whether it is beneficial for Principal to offer non-linear contracts or even
non-Markovian contracts. In order to include more general contracts that Principal can choose,
we follow the approach of Cvitanic´, Possamai and Touzi (2016ab), henceforth CPT (2016ab). The
approach consists of admitting only such contracts for which Agent’s problem satisfies the martin-
gale principle of optimality (dynamic programming principle). We call such contracts viable. This
makes Agent’s problem straightforward to solve. More importantly, CPT (2016ab) prove that in
the finite horizon model this approach represents no loss of generality, that is, Principal’s maximal
utility when optimizing over the restricted family of contracts satisfying the martingale principle
is the same as when maximizing over arbitrary contracts satisfying mild integrability conditions.
While we have not proved similar result in our infinite horizon framework, we conjecture that this
is still true in our model.6 If the conjecture is true, then our optimal contract would be optimal in
an essentially as large as possible family of contracts (including non-linear and non-Markovian).
We remark that Lemma 3.3 below shows that any viable contract can be represented by a
contract of type (3.6). Thus, the intuition of Section 3.1 is based on the most general form of the
contracts we consider.
In order to state the definition of viability, we need the following notation. For t ≥ 0 and a given
Agent’s admissible strategy Ξ= (c¯,Y,m), consider the following class of admissible strategies that
agree with Ξ on [0, t]:
Ξt = {Ξˆ admissible | Ξˆs = Ξs,s ∈ [0, t]}.
Define Agent’s continuation value process V¯ (Ξ) as
V¯t(Ξ) = ess supΞtEt
[∫ ∞
t
e−δ¯ (s−t)uA(c¯s)ds
]
, t ≥ 0.
That is, V¯t(Ξ) is Agent’s optimal value at time t if he employs the strategy Ξ before time t and
acts optimally from time t onward. The continuation value process is expected to satisfy the
martingale principle of optimality (which can be viewed as the dynamic programming principle
in non-Markovian settings): process V˜ (Ξ), defined as
V˜t(Ξ) = e−δ¯ tV¯t(Ξ)+
∫ t
0
e−δ¯ suA(c¯s)ds,
is a supermartingale for arbitrary admissible strategy Ξ, and is a martingale for the optimal strategy
Ξ∗. The definition of viability essentially requires that there exists such a process, and it identi-
fies the sensitivities of the process with respect to the contractible variables and their quadratic
variations and co-variations. To do this properly, we need to introduce some additional notation.
6A working paper Lin, Ren and Touzi (2017) is developing the mathematical theory needed to prove such a
conjecture.
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For real numbers X > 0,Z ≥ b,U,ΓG < 0,ΓI,ΓGI , interpreted later below as the (normalized)
sensitivities of the Agent’s value to the observable factors, define the Hamiltonian H by
H(X ,Z,U,ΓG,ΓI,ΓGI) = sup
(c¯,m≥0,Y )
{
uA(c¯)+X
[
bm− c¯−Zm+ZY ′(µ− r)+Uη ′(µ− r)
+ 12Γ
GY ′ΣRY + 12Γ
Iη ′ΣTη+ΓGIY ′ΣRη
]}
.
(3.8)
It is also convenient to introduce process P via
dPt = (bmt− c¯t)dt, P0 = 0,
which records the impact of Agent’s private action on his wealth.
Definition 3.1 Principal’s admissible strategy Θ= (c,F,y) is viable if there exist
• a constant V¯0 and
• a class of Agent’s admissible strategies Ξ(Θ),
such that
(a) for any Agent’s strategy Ξ ∈ Ξ(Θ), there exist FG,I adapted processes Z,U,ΓG,ΓI,ΓGI , sat-
isfying
∫ t
0 Z
2
s ds < ∞,
∫ t
0 U
2
s ds < ∞, for all t > 0, and Z ≥ b, ΓG < 0 such that the process
V¯ (Ξ) defined by
dV¯t(Ξ) =Xt
[
dPt +ZtdGt +UtdIt + 12Γ
G
t d〈G〉t + 12ΓIt 〈I〉t +ΓGIt d〈G, I〉t
]
+ δ¯V¯t(Ξ)dt−H(Zt ,Ut ,ΓGt ,ΓIt ,ΓGIt )dt, V¯0(Ξ) = V¯0,
(3.9)
where Xt =−rρ¯V¯t(Ξ), satisfies the transversality condition
lim
T→∞
lim
n→∞E
[
e−δ¯T∧τnV¯T∧τn(Ξ)
]
= 0, (3.10)
for any sequence of stopping times {τn}n with limn τn = ∞.
(b) the class Ξ(Θ) contains a strategy Ξ∗ = (c¯∗,m∗,Y ∗) that maximizes the Hamiltonian, that
is, the strategy with
c¯∗ = (u′A)
−1(−rρ¯V¯ (Ξ∗)), m∗ = 0, Y ∗ =− Z
ΓG
Σ−1R (µ− r)−
ΓGI
ΓG
η ; (3.11)
(c) Denoting the reported portfolio value and the contract value by G∗ and F∗, respectively,
when Agent employs strategy Ξ∗, then, Principal’s wealth process, following the dynamics
dWt = rWtdt+dG∗t + ydIt− ctdt−dF∗t , (3.12)
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satisfies the transversality condition
lim
T→∞
lim
n→∞E
[
e−rρWT∧τn
]
= 0, (3.13)
for any sequence of stopping times {τn}n with limn τn = ∞.
Remark 3.1 As we will argue below, process V¯t(Ξ) is Agent’s continuation value process, and
process V˜t(Ξ) = e−δ¯ tV¯t(Ξ)+
∫ t
0 e
−δ¯ suA(c¯s)ds is, indeed, by the definition of H, a supermartingale
for an arbitrary Agent’s admissible action, and a martingale for the strategy in Ξ∗ in (3.11).
Moreover, (3.9) gives a representation for Agent’s continuation value process with sensitivities
with respect to P, G, I,〈G〉, 〈I〉, 〈G, I〉 given by processes X ,XZ,XU, 12XΓG, 12XΓI , and XΓGI ,
respectively. Since U,Z,ΓG,ΓI,ΓGI can be arbitrary FG,I-adapted processes (with Z ≥ b and
ΓG < 0), a viable strategy allows all possible sensitivities with respect to G, I and quadratic
variation and covariations of G and I. Note also that the sensitivity of Agent’s continuation value
with respect to P is the same as the sensitivity with respect to W¯ . Lemma 6.1 below shows that this
sensitivity is equal to −rρ¯V¯ (Ξ), which is why we set sensitivity X equal to that value.
The reason we require Z ≥ b is that, when Zt < b for t, Hamiltonian H is maximized for m=∞.
This would lead to Principal’s wealth being equal to −∞, hence not optimal for Principal. When
Z = b, all nonnegative values of m maximize the Hamiltonian, and Agent is indifferent which m
to choose. In this case, we follow the usual convention in contract theory and assume that Agent
will choose the best value for Principal, i.e., m = 0.
The following lemma shows why the above definition of viability is useful and natural in our
context.
Lemma 3.2 Consider any Principal’s viable strategy Θ = (c,F,y). Assume that ΣR is invertible.
Then, the strategy Ξ∗ = (c¯∗,m∗,Y ∗) in (3.11) is Agent’s optimal strategy in the class Ξ(Θ), and V¯0
is Agent’s optimal value at time 0. Moreover, V¯ (Ξ) is equal to Agent’s continuation value process
V¯ (Ξ).
The following result provides a representation for any viable contract.
Lemma 3.3 Contract F in any viable strategy satisfies
dFt =ZtdGt +UtdIt + 12Γ
G
t d〈G〉t + 12ΓIt d〈I〉t +ΓGIt d〈G, I〉t + 12rρ¯ d〈Z ·G+U · I〉t
− H¯tdt,
(3.14)
where Z ·G = ∫ ·0 ZsdGs, and
H¯t = 1ρ¯ log(−rρ¯V¯0)− 1ρ¯ + δ¯rρ¯ +(ZtY ∗t +Utη)′(µt−r)+ 12ΓGt (Y ∗t )′ΣRY ∗t + 12ΓItη ′ΣRη+ΓGIt (Y ∗t )′ΣRη .
(3.15)
In particular, when µ− r is a constant vector, F is adapted to FG,I .
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Remark 3.4 The lemma shows that a viable contract is linear, in the integration sense, with re-
spect to G, I, their quadratic variation and covariations, and the quadratic variation 〈Z ·G+U · I〉
of Agent’s wealth W¯ . In particular, the linear contracts considered in BVW (2014) of the form, for
some constants φ ,χ, and ψ ,
dFBVWt = φdGt−χdIt +ψdt (3.16)
are viable, but our family of viable contracts include many more possible contracts.
Let us also note that we could have simply started by requiring that a viable contract is of the
form (3.14) for an arbitrary adapted process H¯t (or (3.4) similarily). However, then, it wouldn’t
have been clear how to solve Agent’s problem for arbitrary adapted processes Z,U,ΓG, ΓI , and
ΓGI satisfying the above conditions, and, more importantly, our approach shows why the contracts
of the form (3.14) are as general as can be expected if Agent’s problem can be solved by the
martingale principle.
3.3 Main results
Let us introduce some notation before stating the main results:
- The instantaneous variance of the index portfolio:
Varη = η ′ΣRη .
- The instantaneous variance of the fund portfolio for the fund that invests Y in risky assets:
VarY = Y ′ΣRY.
-The instantaneous covariance between the fund portfolio and the index portfolio:
CovarY,η = η ′ΣRY.
- The CAPM beta of the fund portfolio:
βY = Covar
Y,η
Varη .
3.3.1 Optimal contract and strategies
Given fixed asset prices, not necessarily in asset pricing equilibrium, we first state the results on
the optimal contract and optimal strategies. As we indicated above, if the shirking benefit is high
enough, the optimal contract will have a term depending on the index returns, because the first best
contract, which does not depend on It , would not prevent Agent from shirking. Moreover, since
Principal can invest in the index, she cares about the portfolio’s performance relative to the index.
However, the index term, while alleviating the effect of moral hazard, may provide incentives to
Agent to be too much exposed to the index risk. To counter those incentives, Principal will reward
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Agent for returns in excess of a specific index fund, and will also reward him for the high variation
of deviation from that index fund. As for the optimal asset holdings, Agent will invest not only in
the usual Merton’s fund, rather, he will add the index fund to the mixture. The two funds are not
the same in our model, because the Merton’s fund is not the market portfolio, due to some shares
not being available for trading.
We state these results precisely in the following
Theorem 3.5 Consider a financial market in which the vector of asset returns (per share) has a
constant drift vector µ and constant covariance matrix ΣR such that ΣR is invertible and η ′ΣRη >
0. Assume that Principal can attain a higher value than V u by hiring Agent, and Agent can attain
a higher value than V¯ u by working for Principal. Then, one optimal strategy for Principal is not
to invest in the index, and
(a) The optimal contract in the viable class is given by
dFt =Cdt+
ρ
ρ+ρ¯ dGt +ξ (dGt−βY
∗
dIt)+ r2ζd〈G−βY
∗
I〉t , (3.17)
where G is the reported portfolio return process,
ξ =(b− ρρ+ρ¯ )+,
ζ =(ρ+ ρ¯)Z(1−Z)(b− ρρ+ρ¯ )+,
C = 12r
1
ρ¯ (µ− r)′Σ−1R (µ− r)− (ZY ∗+Uη)′(µ− r)
− r2ζ (Y ∗−βY
∗
η)′ΣR(Y ∗−βY ∗η)+ r2 ρ¯(ZY ∗+Uη)′ΣR(ZY ∗+Uη),
Z =max{b, ρρ+ρ¯ }= ρρ+ρ¯ +(b− ρρ+ρ¯ )+,
U =− (b− ρρ+ρ¯ )+βY
∗
.
(3.18)
(b) Agent’s vector of optimal holdings is given by
Y ∗ =
1
r
1
Cb
Σ−1R (µ− r)+
1
r
(ρ+ ρ¯
ρρ¯
Db
Cb
)η ′(µ− r)
Varη
η , (3.19)
where
Db = (ρ+ ρ¯)
(
b− ρρ+ρ¯
)2
+
, (3.20)
Cb =
ρρ¯
ρ+ρ¯ +Db.
(c) Principal’s value process Vt is of the form
Vt =V (Wt) = Ke−rρWt , (3.21)
for an appropriate constant K.
(d) Agent’s value process satisfies the linear SDE
dV¯t = V¯t
[− rρ¯(ZY +Uη)′(γdBpt +σdBσt )+(δ¯ − r)dt]. (3.22)
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3.4 Contract properties
We now further discuss the optimal contract properties.
1. First best. If b≤ ρρ+ρ¯ , Principal can attain the first best utility, the one she would get if she
was the one choosing portfolio holdings Y rather than Agent choosing them. In this case
ξ = ζ = 0 in (3.17), and Agent receives the fraction ρρ+ρ¯ of the reported portfolio return.
That is, the optimal contract does not have quadratic variation term and is equal to
dFt =
ρ
ρ+ρ¯ dGt .
7
The fraction ρρ+ρ¯ is the classical risk-sharing fraction of the wealth between two agents with
CARA utilities. Moreover, in this case Db = 0, and there is no agency friction.
2. Second best. As mentioned above, in the optimal contract (3.17) the term ρρ+ρ¯ dGt is the
risk-sharing term that is the only incentive part of the contract in the first best case of no
agency friction. The term ξ (dGt−βY ∗dIt) benchmarks the reported portfolio return against
the portfolio that invests βY ∗ in the index. Note that ξ , when strictly positive, corresponds
exactly to the difference between the minimal pay-per-performance sensitivity b that would
prevent shirking and the first best sensitivity, We can think of βY ∗I as the index-based ap-
proximation of the portfolio with strategy Y ∗ which is optimal (in L2 sense) among the
approximations of the form cIt for some constant c. We call this portfolio the optimal bench-
mark portfolio. Thus, ξ (dGt−βY ∗dIt) rewards Agent when the portfolio return is above the
return of the optimal benchmark portfolio, and penalizes Agent when the portfolio return is
below the return of the optimal benchmark portfolio. We emphasize that we endogenously
obtain this benchmarking term, unlike much of the literature that assumes it exogenously.
When b≤ ρρ+ρ¯ , the quadratic variation and covariation parts of the contract are zero. How-
ever, when b> ρρ+ρ¯ , there is a new quadratic variation term compared to BVW (2014). This
new term provides additional incentives for aligning Agent’s risk taking with Principal’s
objectives by rewarding the quadratic variation of the deviation G−βY ∗I from the optimal
benchmark portfolio. Note that when b > ρρ+ρ¯ the sensitivity with respect to 〈G− β θ I〉t
is r2ζ , which is positive, thus rewarding Agent for deviating from the optimal benchmark
portfolio. Thus, the quadratic variation term rewards Agent for taking the specific risk of
individual stocks in a sufficient amount, and not to have too high a bias for the systematic
risk of the index in his portfolio. Thus, it is beneficial for investors to provide incentives for
deviating from the index, as in our contract.
When agency friction b increases, ξ increases, so as to make Agent to not employ the shirk-
ing action. As a result, the portfolio is benchmarked more heavily to the optimal benchmark
7When ξ = ζ = 0, using, from (3.3), Z = ρρ+ρ¯ and ZY
∗+Uη = 1rρ¯ Σ
−1
R (µ− r), we obtain C = 0.
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portfolio. Dependence of ζ on the agency friction is demonstrated in Figure 1. When agency
friction is small, ζ increases with respect to agency friction, so that Agent is increasingly
awarded by taking specific risks. However, when agency friction is large, the benefits of
taking that specific risk are lower, therefore ζ decreases with respect to agency friction, so
that Agent is incentivized not to take as much specific risk.
Severity of agency friction (b)
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Figure 1: Sensitivity to quadratic variation
Finally, the quadratic variation term depends on the interest rate, but the profit sharing and
benchmarking terms do not.
3. Optimal fund holdings. Note that Σ−1R (µ− r) is the vector of risk premia of the individual
risky assets, and η
′(µ−r)
Varη is the risk premium of the index. Therefore, item (c) in Theorem
3.8 shows that Agent’s optimal holding in asset i is a linear combination of the risk pre-
mium of asset i and the portion of the risk premium of the index corresponding to asset i.
Put differently, as mentioned above, a two-fund theorem holds here, with Agent diversify-
ing between the usual fund based on the risk-premia and an index fund (plus the risk-free
asset). Moreover, when agency friction increases, the weight on the usual (first best) fund
decreases, while the weight on the index fund increases, in agreement with the incentives
against shirking being driven by the index fund. Thus, the model predicts that if the agency
frictions are high, the fund managed by Agent will be more of a “closet indexer”. In our
model, though, this is not due to Agent having outside motives to follow the index more
closely, rather, it’s due to the contract with Principal providing him with incentives to do so,
in order to prevent him from shirking.
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3.4.1 Equilibrium prices
We will need the following assumption for the equilibrium result.
Assumption 3.6
(i) θ and η are not linearly dependent.
(ii) Denote ap = (ap1, . . . ,apN)′ and ae = diag{ae1, . . . ,aeN}. For the values
api = air+κ p aei =
1
r+κei
, i = 1, . . . ,N, (3.23)
the matrix
ΣR = apσ2pa
′
p+a
′
eσ
2
e ae (3.24)
is invertible.
Remark 3.7 Since Principal can invest in the index directly, if θ =αη for some α ∈R, then there
exists an equilibrium in which Principal invests in α units of index directly without hiring Agent.
Item (i) in the above assumption excludes this trivial case. Item (ii) ensures that the equilibrium
we characterize is endogenously complete.
The following is the main equilibrium result of the paper.
Theorem 3.8 Suppose that Assumption 3.6 holds. Then, there exists an equilibrium in which
Principal is indifferent with respect to the amount y invested by herself in the index (in particular,
she may choose not to invest in the index directly, i.e., to set y = 0), in which asset prices are as in
(2.13), the volatility matrix is ΣR in (3.24), and:8
(a) Vectors ap and ae are given by (3.23) and vector a0 = (a01, . . . ,a0N)′ is given by, withDb given
in (3.20),
a0 = 1rκ
p p¯ap+ 1r (κ
e)′e¯ae− ρρ¯ρ+ρ¯ΣRθ −DbΣR(θ −β θη), (3.25)
(b) The vector of asset excess returns is given by
µ− r = r ρρ¯ρ+ρ¯ΣRθ + rDbΣR(θ −β θη). (3.26)
The index excess return is
η ′(µ− r) = r ρρ¯ρ+ρ¯Covarθ ,η . (3.27)
The excess return of Agent’s portfolio is
θ ′(µ− r) = r ρρ¯ρ+ρ¯Varθ + rDb
(
Varθ − (Covarθ ,η )2Varη
)
. (3.28)
8The intuition why the equilibrium quantities do not depend on y is that, with the appropriate choice of the
contract, Principal can get Agent to invest for her in the index in the exact amount that she would have, and this has
no impact on asset prices.
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(c) Principal offers optimally the contract that assigns to Agent the value
V¯0 = V¯ u0 =−exp
(
1− δ¯r − log(rρ¯)− 12r (µ− r)′Σ−1R (µ− r)
)
,
that is the minimal value Agent would accept. With this choice, Principal is always willing to
offer the contract. Moreover, Principal’s value process is given by V (Wt) = Ke−rρWt where
K =−exp
(
1− δr − log(rρ)+ r2 ρρ¯ (C 2b − ρ¯Cb)Varθ + r2 ρρ¯ (D2b −2CbDb+ ρ¯Db) (Covar
θ ,η )2
Varη
)
.
(3.29)
In this model with Gaussian dividends, the equilibrium volatility matrix is constant, and, in
fact, the same as in Theorem 6.1 in BVW (2014). That is, the extra incentives coming from the
quadratic (co)variations affect only Agent’s impact on the excess returns, and not on the variance-
covariance structure. We discuss in Conclusions the possibility of having stochastic equilibrium
volatility in other models.
3.5 Equilibrium properties
1. Price and returns distortion. Note that Db increases with b. We see then, from (3.26),
that the risk premium of asset i increases (resp. decreases) with b when θi/ηi > β θ (resp.
θi/ηi < β θ ). That is, whether the risk premium goes up or down with agency frictions
depends on how large is the fund’s relative holding θi/ηi of asset i compared to the CAPM
beta of the fund. Thus, the stocks in large supply have high risk premia, and the stocks in
low supply have low risk premia, and this effect is stronger as agency friction increases.
As noted in BVW (2014), this is because the assets in high supply, for example, have to
offer high premium for Agent to be willing to give them weight higher than their weight
in the index. The price is distorted reversely. We see from (3.25) that the price of asset i
decreases (resp. increases) with b when θi/ηi > β θ (resp. θi/ηi < β θ ). Therefore assets in
large supply have lower prices and assets in low supply have higher price, and the effect is
stronger as agency friction increases.
The above is the same qualitative behavior as in BVW (2014). However, there is a quantita-
tive difference. In BVW (2014), Db is replaced by
DBVWb = ρ¯(b− ρρ+ρ¯ )+.
Note thatDb <DBVWb for any b∈ (0,1). Therefore, our price and returns distortions are less
sensitive to agency friction than those in BVW (2014). Moreover, when agency friction is
small, our sensitivities are of second order magnitude compared to the first order magnitude
in BVW (2014). However, when b = 1, D1 and DBVW1 are the same.
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Let us now take the same parameters as in BVW (2014): ρ = 1, ρ¯ = 50,r = 4%,κ p = κei =
10%,N = 6,ηi = 1,θ1 = θ2 = θ3 = 0.7,θ4 = θ5 = θ6 = 0.3,ai = 1, p¯ = 0.65, e¯i = 0.4,σp =
1,
σ2p
p¯ =
σ2ei
e¯i
, for i= 1, . . . ,6. Figure 2 compares distortion of excess return in our equilibrium
with the one in BVW (2014).
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Figure 2: Expected excess return of the two groups of assets. Assets with large supply are in the
top half, assets with low supply are in the bottom half. The results of this paper are presented in
solid lines, the results in BVW (2014) are presented in dashed lines.
2. Portfolio returns. As we see from (3.27), agency friction does not have impact on index
excess return. This is because Principal can trade the index privately. However, (3.28)
indicates that excess return of Agent’s portfolio depends on agency friction. Since Varθ >
(Covarθ ,η )2
Varθ by Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, the excess return of Agent’s portfolio increases
with agency friction. This means the increase in return of large supply assets dominates the
decrease in return of low supply assets. To give an intuition for this, note that the value-
weighted market share of the assets in large supply becomes very high relative the share of
the assets in low supply, because the former are not only in large supply to start with, but
also more expensive in equilibrium. This asymmetry in the relative share of the two classes
of assets makes it harder for Agent to trade against the high value of the larger class. Figure
3 demonstrates the excess return of Agent’s portfolio in our equilibrium in comparison with
BVW (2014). As with price distortions, the increase in excess return due to agency frictions
is lower in our model, due to a more efficient contract.
Since the excess return of index does not change, the increase in Agent’s portfolio return
implies that there is a decrease in the return of the portfolio held by buy-and-hold investors.
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Figure 3: Expected excess return of Agent’s portfolio. The result of this paper is presented as a
solid line, the result in BVW is presented in dashed lines.
However, since Db is lower in our model, this means that buy-and-hold investors lose less
compared to BVW (2014).
3. Contract. In equilibrium Y ∗ = θ , so that from (3.27) we get
β θ = 1r
ρ+ρ¯
ρρ¯
η ′(µ−r)
Varη
This is recognized as the optimal portfolio holding in the index in the case in which Agent
and Principal can invest only in the index and they share the risk in the first best situation. We
call this portfolio the index-sharing portfolio. Thus, ξ (dGt−β θdIt) rewards Agent when the
portfolio return is above the return of the index-sharing portfolio, and penalizes Agent when
the portfolio return is below the return of the index-sharing portfolio; the term ζd〈G−β θ I〉t
rewards Agent for taking more of the specific risk of individual stocks, relative to the risk
of the index-sharing portfolio. Note that this term makes the cumulative compensation Ft
history dependent; in contrast to BVW (2014) or to other literature on the subject, with
an exception of Leung (2016), the portfolio manager’s current cumulative compensation
depends on historical returns, and more precisely (in the natural discretized implementation
of the model) on the sample variance of the portfolio’s deviations from the index sharing
portfolio; and we get this term endogenously, as a part of the optimal contract.
4. Principal’s optimal value. Given the excess return in BVW (2014) equal to
µ− r = rρ¯ΣR(Zθ +Uη),
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and the same parameters as in BVW (2014) (see Figure 2), Figure 4 demonstrates that
Principal’s certainty equivalence could be improved substantially when the contract (3.17)
is employed compared to (3.16). However, under this new contract, holding the residual
demand to clear the market is no longer optimal for Agent. Therefore, the equilibrium in
BVW (2014) fails to be an equilibrium when Principal is allowed to choose contracts from
our viable class.
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Figure 4: Certainty equivalence of Principal when asset prices are as in BVW (2014). Solid
line represents Principal’s certainty equivalence when contract (3.17) is implemented, dashed line
represents Principal’s certainty equivalence when the contract in BVW (2014) is implemented.
4 Extensions: Agent can invest privately
In this section, we extend the baseline model in Section 2 to two cases in which Agent is allowed
to invest privately.
4.1 Private investment in individual risky assets
In this section, Agent is allowed to trade any individual risky assets. However, neither his invest-
ment strategy nor his private wealth are observable by Principal. Therefore, similar to the baseline
model, Principal can only use the contract variables G and I.
Given contract F , Agent’s private wealth process follows
dW¯t = (rW¯t +bmt− c¯t)dt+ Y¯ ′t dRt +dFt , (4.1)
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where the vector valued process Y¯ represents the number of shares that Agent invests in each risky
asset privately. This investment process is assumed to be adapted to F and to satisfy
∫ t
0 |Y¯s|2ds<∞
for all t ≥ 0. Principal’s optimization problem is the same as before. The notion of equilibrium
in Definition 2.1 is modified accordingly, so that in item (i) Agent’s optimal investment strategy Y
and Y¯ satisfy Y + Y¯ = θ − yη .
Similar to the baseline model, we restrict Principal’s contracts to those for which Agent’s
optimization problem satisfies the martingale principle Rather than starting from the general viable
class in Definition 3.1, we give the explicit representation F directly. The viable class of contracts
Θ together with Agent’s admissible strategies Ξ(Θ) can be introduced similarly.
Given FG,I-adapted processes Z,U,ΓG,ΓI,ΓGI such that Z ≥ b, ΓG 6= 0, and ΓG− 12rρ¯Z2 < 0,
consider a contract F whose dynamics follow
dFt = ZtdGt +UtdIt + 12Γ
G
t d〈G〉t + 12ΓIt d〈I〉t +ΓGIt d〈G, I〉t− H¯(Zt ,Ut ,ΓGt ,ΓIt ,ΓGI)tdt, (4.2)
where
H¯(Z,U,ΓG,ΓI,ΓGI)
= δ¯rρ¯ +
1
ρ¯ log(−rρ¯V¯0)− 1ρ¯
+ sup
Y,Y¯
{
(ZY +Uη+ Y¯ )′(µ− r)+ 12ΓGY ′ΣRY + 12ΓIη ′ΣRη+ΓGIY ′ΣRη
− 12rρ¯(ZY +Uη+ Y¯ )′ΣR(ZY +Uη+ Y¯ )
}
. (4.3)
The optimizers of H¯ are
Y ∗ =−Γ
GI
ΓG
η and Y¯ ∗ =
1
rρ¯
Σ−1R (µ− r)+
ZΓGI−UΓG
ΓG
η . (4.4)
Therefore, Agent’s candidate optimal strategy is given by Ξ∗ = (c¯∗,m∗,Y ∗,Y¯ ∗), where m∗ = 0
and c¯∗ =
(
u′A
)−1
(−rρ¯V¯0e−rρ¯W¯ ) for some constant V¯0 < 0. Similarly to Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3, the
following result holds.
Lemma 4.1 Suppose that ΣR is invertible, and the transversality condition (2.7) is satisfied when
Agent employs the strategy Ξ∗. Then Ξ∗ is Agent’s optimal strategy in Ξ(Θ) and V¯0 is Agent’s
optimal value at time 0.
Agent’s optimal strategy Y ∗ in (4.4) is such that Principal gets access only to index investment
through contracting. Since Principal can invest in the index by herself, Principal is indifferent with
respect to not hiring Agent or hiring Agent with any contract of type (4.2). In this case, there exists
an equilibrium in which both Agent and Principal invest only privately, as stated next.
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Theorem 4.2 Suppose that Assumption 3.6 holds. Then Principal’s index investment and the
optimal contract in the viable class are given by y∗ and (4.2) for any FGI-adapted processes
y∗,Z,U,ΓG,ΓI,ΓGI satisfying Z ≥ b, ΓG 6= 0, ΓG− 12rρ¯Z2 < 0, and
(Z−1)Γ
GI
ΓG
−U + y∗ = 1
rρ
η ′(µ− r)
η ′ΣRη
. (4.5)
In particular, Principal can choose ΓGI =U = 0, Z = 1, and y∗ = 1rρ
η ′(µ−r)
η ′ΣRη . Then, Agent does not
invest for Principal, y∗ and Y ∗= 1rρ¯Σ
−1
R (µ−r) are the optimal investment strategies corresponding
to Principal’s and Agent’s outside options. Moreover, any of the above contracts are optimal in
the equilibrium in which
1
rρ¯
Σ−1R (µ− r)+
1
rρ
η ′(µ− r)
η ′ΣRη
η = θ and µ− r = rρ¯ΣR
(
θ − ρ¯
ρ+ ρ¯
β θη
)
.
Intuitively, unlike in our benchmark model, here Agent can benefit fully from the individual
risky assets by investing on his own, and there are no gains from contracting.
4.2 Private investment in the index
Theorem 4.2 shows that there is no benefit in contracting for Principal when Agent is allowed to
invest in individual assets privately. We now restrict Agent’s private investment opportunities to
the index. Moreover, Principal also requires Agent to report his private investment value. Agent
may misreport it, but we show that Principal can offer a contract to incentivize truth-telling and
restore the second best case of the baseline model in Section 2.
When Agent is only allowed to invest in the index, his investment strategy can be described by
a F-adapted scalar process y¯. We introduce Agent’s reported portfolio value by
G¯t =
∫ t
0
[y¯sη ′dRs− m¯sds],
where m¯ denotes Agent’s misreporting. Unlike the shirking action affecting Principal’s portfolio,
misreporting action m¯ is allowed to be either negative or positive. When m¯ is negative (resp.
positive), Agent’s reported portfolio value is less (resp. more) than the true value. The under-
reporting (resp. over-reporting) benefits (hurts) Agent’s private wealth process that follows
dW¯t = (rW¯t +bmt + m¯t− c¯t)dt+dG¯t +dFt .
We assume that Principal can contract on G¯.
Similar to the previous section, we will introduce a class of contracts which are derived from
the martingale principle. The corresponding viable class can be defined similarly. Given FG,G¯,I-
adapted processes Z,U,Γ′s such that Z ≥ b, ΓG < 0, and ΓGΓG¯− (ΓGG¯)> 0, consider the contract
dFt =ZtdGt +UtdIt
+ 12Γ
G
t d〈G〉t + 12ΓG¯t d〈G¯〉t + 12ΓIt d〈I〉t +ΓGIt d〈G, I〉t +ΓGG¯t d〈G, G¯〉t +ΓG¯It d〈G¯, I〉t
+ 12rρ¯ d〈Z ·G+U · I+ G¯〉t− H¯tdt,
(4.6)
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where
H¯ = δ¯rρ¯ +
1
ρ¯ log(−rρ¯V¯0)− 1ρ¯
+ sup
Y,y¯
{
(ZY +Uη+ y¯η)′(µ− r)+ 12ΓGY ′ΣRY + 12ΓG¯y¯2η ′ΣRη+ 12ΓIη ′ΣRη
+ΓGIY ′ΣRη+ΓGG¯y¯Y ′ΣRη+ΓG¯I y¯η ′ΣRη
}
. (4.7)
Observe that F in (4.6) is invariant under different m¯. Therefore, Agent is indifferent between
truth-telling and misreporting. Therefore, we assume Agent reports his portfolio value truthfully,
i.e., m¯∗ = 0. The optimizers of H¯ are
Y ∗ =− Z
ΓG
Σ−1R (µ− r)−
ΓGI
ΓG
η− Γ
GG¯
ΓG
y¯∗η , (4.8)
y¯∗ =
ZΓGG¯−ΓG
ΓG¯ΓG− (ΓGG¯)2
η ′(µ− r)
η ′ΣRη
+
ΓGIΓGG¯−ΓGΓG¯I
ΓGΓG¯− (ΓGG¯)2 . (4.9)
Agent’s candidate optimal strategy is then Ξ∗ = (c¯∗,m∗, m¯∗,Y ∗, y¯∗) with c¯∗ and m¯∗ the same as in
the previous section. Similar to Lemmas 3.2, 3.3, the same statements of 4.1 hold in this case, and
in particular, Ξ∗ is Agent’s optimal strategy.
For the contract in (4.6), there exists a particular choice of sensitivity processes Γ’s such that
it is optimal for Agent and Principal not to invest in the index. Therefore, the equilibrium is the
same as in the baseline case.
Theorem 4.3 Suppose that Assumption 3.6 holds. Then, there exists an equilibrium in which
statements (a)-(c), (e), and (f) in Theorem 3.8 hold. Moreover, both Agent and Principal do not
invest in the index. The optimal contract in the viable class is
dFt =Cdt+
ρ
ρ+ρ¯ dGt +ξ (dGt−βY
∗
dIt)+ r2ζd〈G−βY
∗
I〉t
+ 12(Γ
G¯+ rρ¯)d〈G¯〉t +(ΓGG¯+ rρ¯Z)d〈G, G¯〉t +(ΓG¯I + rρ¯U)d〈G¯, I〉t ,
(4.10)
where C from (3.18), Z,U,ξ ,ζ are the same as in (3.18), and
ΓG¯ > 1Z2Γ
G, ΓGG¯ = 1−ZZ Γ
G, ΓG¯I = 1ZΓ
GI, ΓG =−rZCb, ΓGI = rZDbβY ∗.
5 Conclusions
We find equilibrium asset prices in a model with OU dynamics for the dividend processes, in a
market in which CARA investors hire CARA portfolio managers. The optimal contract involves
rewarding the manager for return in excess of a benchmark portfolio value, and for quadratic
deviation thereof. The latter provides incentives to Agent to take on specific risk of individual
stocks. We find that the stocks in large supply have high risk premia, and the stocks in low supply
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have low risk premia, and this effect is stronger as agency friction increases. However, this effect
is of a lower order of magnitude than when only the contracts without the quadratic variation terms
are allowed, as in BVW (2014). Therefore, introducing the quadratic variation term in the contract
mitigates the price/return distortion of asset prices in equilibrium. It would be of interest to study,
in the future, the problem with dividends modeled as square-root processes, in which case the
contract terms would change with the state of the economy, and the volatility would also depend
on the agency frictions in equilibrium. This would require numerically solving the corresponding
HJB equations.
6 Proofs
6.1 Properties of W¯t
The following lemma provides two properties of the continuation value in our setting.
Lemma 6.1 For any t ≥ 0 and admissible Ξ,
(i) ∂W¯t V¯t(Ξ) =−rρ¯V¯t(Ξ);
(ii) limt→∞E
[
e−δ¯ tV¯t(Ξ)
]
= 0.
Proof: We denote V¯t(Ξ) by V¯t(W¯t) to emphasize its dependence on W¯t . Let (c¯′s)s≥t be Agent’s
optimal consumption stream from t onwards. Note that c¯′ is financed by a wealth process starting
from W¯t at time t. Therefore c¯′− rW¯t can be financed by a wealth process starting from 0 at time
t. Agent’s exponential utility function implies that
V¯t(0)≥ erρ¯W¯t V¯t(W¯t).
Above inequality is in fact an equality, i.e., c¯′−rW¯t is optimal for V¯t(0). Assuming otherwise, there
exists another consumption stream c¯
′′
whose associated value is strictly larger than erρ¯W¯t V¯t(W¯t).
Since c¯
′′
is financed by a wealth process starting from 0 at time t, c¯
′′
+ rW¯t can be financed by a
wealth process starting from W¯t at time t. Moreover, the expected utility associated to c¯
′′
+ rW¯t
is strictly larger than V¯t(W¯t), contradicting the optimality of c¯′ for V¯t(W¯t). Therefore, V¯t(W¯t) =
e−rρ¯W¯t V¯t(0), confirming item (i).
For item (ii), definition of V¯t(Ξ) yields
E
[
e−δ¯ tV¯t(Ξ)
]
= E
[∫ ∞
t
e−δ¯ suA(c¯ts)ds
]
,
where c¯t is Agent’s optimal consumption stream from t onwards. Then, item (ii) follows from
applying the monotone convergence theorem on the right-hand side.
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6.2 Proof of Lemma 3.2
First order condition for c¯ and Y in (3.8) gives
u′A(c¯) = X and Γ
GΣRY =−Z(µ− r)−ΓGIΣRη .
Since the optimization problem on the right-hand side of (3.8) is concave in c¯ and Y , and Z ≥ b,
we have that Ξ∗ = (c¯∗,m∗,Y ∗) in (3.11) is the optimizer for H.
For an arbitrary Agent’s admissible strategy Ξ= (c¯,m,Y ), consider the process
V˜t(Ξ) =
∫ t
0
e−δ¯ suA(c¯s)ds+ e−δ¯ tV¯t(Ξ), t ≥ 0,
where V¯ (Ξ) is defined via (3.9). The definition of H in (3.8) implies that V˜ (Ξ) is a local super-
martingale. Taking a localizing sequence {τn}n for this local supermartingale and arbitrary T ∈R,
we obtain
E
[∫ T∧τn
0
e−δ¯ suA(c¯s)ds
]
+E
[
e−δ¯ (T∧τn)V¯T∧τn(Ξ)
]
= E[V˜T∧τn(Ξ)]≤ V˜0(Ξ) = V¯0. (6.1)
Sending n, and then T to infinity, applying the monotone convergence theorem to the first term on
the left-hand side, and (3.10) to the second term, we obtain
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δ¯ suA(c¯s)ds
]
≤ V¯0.
For strategy Ξ∗ = (c¯∗,m∗,Y ∗), V˜ is a local martingale. Then, the inequality in (6.1) is an equality.
Sending n, and then T to infinity and using the transversality condition for V¯ (Ξ∗), optimality of
Ξ∗ is confirmed. Thus, V¯0 is Agent’s optimal value at time 0. A similar argument works for V¯t .
6.3 Proof of Lemma 3.3
Introduce Vˆt = V¯0e−rρ¯W¯t , where W¯ follows (2.5) with F in (3.14). We claim that Vˆ = V¯ (Ξ).
Therefore, when Agent is offered the contract F in (3.14), and with everything else remaining the
same, his continuation value satisfies the viability condition (3.9). To prove the claim notice first
that Hamiltonian H in (3.8) can be written as
H = X
[
1
ρ¯ log(X)− 1ρ¯ +(ZY ∗+Uη)′(µ− r)+ 12ΓG(Y ∗)′ΣRY ∗+ 12ΓIη ′ΣRη+ΓGI(Y ∗)′ΣRη
]
.
(6.2)
Next, we also notice that SDE (3.9) for V¯ (Ξ) has locally Lipschitz coefficients on (−∞,0), hence
it admits a unique strong solution before the solution hitting either −∞ or 0. On the other hand,
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applying Itoˆ’s formula to Vˆ , we have
dVˆt =Xt
[
(rW¯t +bmt− c¯t)dt+dFt
]
− 12rρ¯Xtd〈Z ·G+U · I〉t
=Xt
[
(rW¯t +bmt− c¯t)dt+ZtdGt +UtdIt + 12ΓGt d〈G〉t + 12ΓId〈I〉t +ΓGIt d〈G, I〉t− H¯t
]
=δ¯Vˆt +Xt
[
dPt +ZtdGt +UtdIt + 12Γ
G
t d〈G〉t + 12ΓIt d〈I〉t +ΓGIt d〈G, I〉t− (−rW¯t + H¯t− δ¯rρ¯ )
]
=δ¯Vˆt +Xt
[
dPt +ZtdGt +UtdIt + 12Γ
G
t d〈G〉t + 12ΓIt 〈I〉t +ΓGIt d〈G, I〉t
]
−Htdt,
where Xt =−rρ¯Vˆt and the fourth identity follows from −rW¯t + 1ρ¯ log(−rρ¯V¯0) = 1ρ¯ log(−rρ¯Vˆt) =
1
ρ¯ log(X) and (6.2). Thus, Vˆ satisfies (3.9) and it does not hit −∞ or 0 in finite time, since W¯ does
not hit −∞ nor ∞ in finite time. Therefore, Vˆ is the unique solution of (3.9).
6.4 Proof of Theorem 3.5
6.4.1 Step 1: Preparation
Given Z,U,ΓG,ΓGI satisfying Z ≥ b and ΓG < 0, we denote
U¯ = UZ , Γ¯
G =− ZΓG , and Γ¯GI =−Γ
GI
ΓG . (6.3)
Then, Agent’s optimal strategy Ξ∗ from (3.11) is
c¯∗ = (u′A)
−1(−rρ¯V¯ (Ξ∗)), m∗ = 0, Y ∗ = Γ¯Gα+ Γ¯GIη , (6.4)
where α = {αt}t≥0 with αt = Σ−1R (µt− r).
When Agent employs the optimal strategy Ξ∗, using (3.14) and (3.15), we see that the contract
takes the form
dF∗t =−
(
1
ρ¯ log(−rρ¯V¯0)+ δ¯rρ¯ − 1ρ¯ − 12rρ¯Z2t (Y ∗t +U¯tη)′ΣR(Y ∗t +U¯tη)
)
dt+Zt(Y ∗t +U¯tη)
′(γdBpt +σdBet ).
Then, Principal’s wealth process (3.12) follows
dWt =
(
rWt− ct + 1ρ¯ log(−rρ¯V¯0)+ δ¯rρ¯ − 1ρ¯ − 12rρ¯Z2t (Y ∗t +U¯tη)′ΣR(Y ∗t +U¯tη)
)
dt
+(Y ∗t + ytη)
′dRt−Zt(Y ∗t +U¯tη)′(γdBpt +σdBet ).
(6.5)
6.4.2 Step 2: Principal’s HJB equation
For constant µ , we conjecture that Principal’s value function is given as
V (w) = Ke−rρw, (6.6)
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for some constant K < 0. This value function is expected to satisfy the following HJB equation
δV = sup
Z≥b,U¯ ,Γ¯G,Γ¯GI ,c,y
{
up(c)+Vw
[
rw− c+ 1ρ¯ log(−rρ¯V¯0)+ δ¯rρ¯ − 1ρ¯
]
+Vw
[
(Y ∗+ yη)′(µ− r)− 12rρ¯Z2(Y ∗+U¯η)′ΣR(Y ∗+U¯η)
]
+ 12Vww
[
(Y ∗+ yη)−Z(Y ∗+U¯η)]′ΣR[(Y ∗+ yη)−Z(Y ∗+U¯η)]}.
(6.7)
Note that Y ∗+yη = Γ¯Gα+(Γ¯GI +y)η and Y ∗+U¯η = Γ¯Gα+(Γ¯GI +U¯)η . Therefore, instead of
optimizing over U¯ , Γ¯GI , and y individually, we can optimize over Γ¯GI + y,U¯ − y, and still obtain
the same maximum value. This means that Principal is indifferent with respect to which amount y
to invest in the index. For notational simplicity, we assume Principal chooses
y = 0. (6.8)
The maximizer of c in (6.7) is
c = (u′P)
−1(Vw). (6.9)
Plugging (6.6), (6.8), and (6.9) back into (6.7), and taking into account that K < 0, we reduce (6.7)
to
r−δ = sup
Z≥b,U˜ ,Γ¯GI ,Γ¯G
{
ρ
ρ¯ (δ¯ − r)+ rρ
[
(Y ∗)′(µ− r)+ 1ρ¯ log(−rρ¯V¯0)+ 1ρ log(−rρK)
]
− 12r2ρ2
[
(Y ∗)′ΣRY ∗
]
+ r2ρ2Z
[
(Y ∗+U¯η)′ΣRY ∗
]
− 12r2ρ(ρ¯+ρ)Z2
[
(Y ∗+U¯η)′ΣR(Y ∗+U¯η)
]}
.
(6.10)
The first order condition of optimality for U¯ in (6.10) yields
(ρ+ ρ¯)Z[η ′ΣRη ]U¯ = [ρ− (ρ+ ρ¯)Z][η ′ΣRY ∗].
Since we assume that η ′ΣRη > 0, the concavity in U¯ of the maximization problem in (6.10) implies
that the maximizer in U¯ is
U¯ =
ρ− (ρ+ ρ¯)Z
(ρ+ ρ¯)Z
CovarY
∗,η
Varη
. (6.11)
Using (6.4), the first order condition for Γ¯GI in (6.10) is
0 = η ′(µ− r)− rCb
[
Covarα,η Γ¯G+Varη Γ¯GI
]
+ rZ(ρ− (ρ+ ρ¯)Z)VarηU¯ . (6.12)
Plugging in (6.11) for U¯ , the previous equation is transformed into
0 = η ′(µ− r)+ r(Db−Cb)
[
Covarα,η Γ¯G+Varη Γ¯GI
]
, (6.13)
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where
Cb = ρ(1−Z)2+ ρ¯Z2 and Db = (ρ− (ρ+ ρ¯)Z)
2
ρ+ ρ¯
. (6.14)
Similarly, the first order condition for Γ¯G in (6.10) is
0 = α ′(µ− r)− rCb
[
Varα Γ¯G+Covarη ,α Γ¯GI
]
+ rZ(ρ− (ρ+ ρ¯)Z)Covarη ,αU¯ .
Plugging in the expression (6.11) for U¯ , the previous equation is transformed into
0 = α ′(µ− r)+ r(Db−Cb)Covarη ,α Γ¯GI + r
[
Db
(Covarη ,α)2
Varη
−CbVarα
]
Γ¯G. (6.15)
Solving (6.13) and (6.15) for Γ¯G and Γ¯GI , and using
Covarη ,α = η ′ΣRα = η ′ΣRΣ−1R (µ− r) = η ′(µ− r),
Varα = α ′ΣRα = α ′(µ− r),
we obtain
Γ¯G =
1
rCb
, (6.16)
Γ¯GI =
Db
rCb(Cb−Db)
η ′(µ− r)
Varη
. (6.17)
On the right-hand side of (6.10), the function to be maximized tends to negative infinity when
either |Γ¯G| → ∞ or |Γ¯GI| → ∞. Therefore, Γ¯G and Γ¯GI obtained in (6.16) and (6.17) are the
maximizers for the maximization problem in (6.10). Moreover, since µ − r is a constant vector,
Y ∗ = Γ¯Gα+ Γ¯GIη is a constant vector as well.
Another form of Γ¯GI that will be useful later can be obtained by plugging (6.16) back into
(6.12) and using (6.11). This gives
Γ¯GI =
Db
Cb
CovarY
∗,η
Varη
. (6.18)
Finally, the unconstrained first order condition for Z in (6.10) gives
0 = ρ
[
(Y ∗+U¯η)′ΣRY ∗
]− (ρ+ ρ¯)Z[(Y ∗+U¯η)′ΣR(Y ∗+U¯η)].
Plugging the expression of U¯ from (6.11) into the previous equation, we can solve it and get
Z = ρρ+ρ¯ . Since the maximization problem in (6.7) is concave in Z, under the constraint Z ≥ b
optimal Z is
Z = max
{
ρ
ρ+ρ¯ ,b
}
. (6.19)
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6.4.3 Step 3: Optimal contract
Plugging (6.11), (6.16), and (6.18) back to (6.3) yields
U =−(Z− ρρ+ρ¯ )βY
∗
, ΓG =−rZCb, and ΓGI = rZDbβY ∗, where βY ∗ = Covar
Y ∗,η
Varη
.
Combining the previous expressions with (3.14), we obtain
ZdGt +UtdIt =
ρ
ρ+ρ¯ dGt +ξ (dGt−βY
∗
dIt),
1
2Γ
Gd〈G〉t +ΓGId〈G, I〉t + 12rρ¯Z2d〈G+U¯I〉t = r2ζ
[
d〈G〉t−2d〈G,βY ∗I〉t
]
+ 12rρ¯U
2d〈I〉t ,
where
ξ = (b− ρρ+ρ¯ )+ and ζ = (ρ+ ρ¯)Z(1−Z)(b− ρρ+ρ¯ )+.
In order to have 〈G−βY ∗I〉t instead of 〈G〉t−2〈G,βY ∗I〉t in the above expression, we introduce
1
2Γ
I = r2
[
ξ − ρ¯(Z− ρρ+ρ¯ )2
](
βY
∗)2
.
Then,
1
2Γ
Gd〈G〉t +ΓGId〈G, I〉t + 12ΓId〈I〉t + 12rρ¯Z2d〈G+U¯I〉t = r2ζd〈G−βY
∗
I〉t .
On the other hand,
δ¯
rρ¯ + H¯ =
1
ρ¯ log(−rρ¯V¯0)+ δ¯rρ¯ − 1ρ¯ +(ZY ∗+Uη)′(µ− r)
+ r2ζ (Y
∗−βY ∗I)′ΣR(Y ∗−βY ∗I)− r2 ρ¯(ZY ∗+Uη)′ΣR(ZY ∗+Uη).
Collecting above results and combining them with (3.14), we obtain
dFt =Cdt+
ρ
ρ+ρ¯ dGt +ξ (dGt−βY
∗
dIt)+ r2ζd〈G−βY
∗
I〉t , (6.20)
where
C =− 1ρ¯ log(−rρ¯V¯0)− δ¯rρ¯ + 1ρ¯ − (ZY ∗+Uη)′(µ− r)
− r2ζ (Y ∗−βY
∗
I)′ΣR(Y ∗−βY ∗I)+ r2 ρ¯(ZY ∗+Uη)′ΣR(ZY ∗+Uη).
(6.21)
6.4.4 Step 4: Verifications
Let us verify that Θ = (c,F,y), defined by (6.9), (6.20), and (6.8), is viable. First, when Agent
employs the strategy Ξ∗ with constant Y ∗, we have from (3.9), (3.8) that
dV¯t(Ξ∗) =−rρ¯V¯t(Ξ∗)[ZY ∗+Uη ]′(γdBpt +σdBet )+(δ¯ − r)V¯t(Ξ∗)dt.
Therefore, V¯ (Ξ∗) is given by
V¯t(Ξ∗) = V¯0e(δ¯−r)tE
(
− rρ¯
∫ t
0
(ZY ∗+Uη)′(γdBps +σdB
σ
s )
)
.
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We need to show that V¯ (Ξ∗) satisfies the transversality condition (3.10). To this end, take any
T ∈ R and any sequence of stopping times {τn}n converging to infinity. Since Y ∗ is a constant
vector, then Z and U are constants, therefore the above stochastic exponential is a martingale,
hence the family{
E
(
− rρ¯
∫ T∧τn
0
(Zθ +Uη)′(γdBps +σdB
σ
s )
)}
n
is uniformly integrable in n.
As a result,
lim
n→∞E
[
e−δ¯T∧τnV¯T∧τn(Ξ
∗)
]
= V¯0e−rTE
[
E
(
− rρ¯
∫ T
0
(Zθ +Uη)′(γdBps +σdB
σ
s )
)]
= V¯0e−rT ,
which vanishes when T → ∞. Therefore Lemma 3.2 shows that Ξ∗ = (c¯∗,m∗,Y ∗) in (3.11) is
Agent’s optimal strategy in Ξ(Θ).
Next we need to show that Θ is adapted to FG∗,I . Combining (6.6) and (6.9) yields
c =− 1ρ log(−rρK)+ rW.
Plugging this expression for c into (3.12) we obtain
dWt = 1ρ log(−rρK)dt+dG∗t −dF∗.
We have seen in Lemma 3.3 that F∗ is adapted to FG∗,I , thus W and c are adapted to the same
filtration.
It remains to check the transversality condition (3.13) is satisfied. To this end, applying Itoˆ’s
formula to Vt =V (Wt), and using (6.7) and (6.9), we obtain
dVt = (δ − r)Vtdt− rρVt [Y ∗− (ZY ∗+Uη)]′[γdBpt +σdBet ].
Therefore
Vt =V0e(δ−r)tE
(
− rρ
∫ t
0
[Y ∗− (ZY ∗+Uη))′[γdBps +σdBes]
)
.
The same argument leading to verify (3.10) above yields that (3.13) is satisfied. This concludes
the proof of viability for Principal’s strategy Θ.
Let us now verify the optimality of Principal’s strategy Θ. For arbitrary Principal’s viable
strategy Θ˜= (c˜, F˜ , y˜) and its associated Agent’s optimal strategy Ξ˜∗, consider the process
V˜t =
∫ t
0
e−δ suP(c˜s)ds+ e−δ tV (Wt),
where V (w) is defined in (6.6). From the HJB equation (6.7), we obtain that V˜ is a local super-
martingale. Using the same localization argument as in the proof of Lemma 3.2 together with the
transversality condition (3.13), we obtain
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δ suP(c˜s)ds
]
≤ V˜0 =V (W0),
where the inequality is equality when Principal chooses Θ. This verifies the optimality of Θ.
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6.5 Proof of Theorem 3.8
6.5.1 Step 1: Equilibrium asset prices
In equilibrium with y = 0, we necessarily have Y ∗ = θ . Then, (6.4) combined with (6.16) and
(6.18) yields9
θ =
1
rCb
αt +
Db
Cb
β θη . (6.22)
Next, recall that αt = Σ−1R (µt− r). Left-multiplying (6.22) by rCbη ′ΣR leads to
rCbη ′ΣRθ = η ′(µt− r)+ rDbCovarθ ,η .
Note that all the terms above equation are constants except for the first term on the right-hand
side, which is η ′(ptA1+ etA2+A3). Since this equation has to hold for all values of pt and et in
equilibrium, it is necessary to have
A1 = 0 and A2 = 0.
Hence µ is a constant. Recalling the definition of A1 and A2 in (2.14), we then obtain
api =
ai
r+κ p
, aei =
1
r+κei
, i = 1, . . . ,N. (6.23)
In order to determine a0, we left-multiply both sides of (6.22) by rCbΣR, and using A1 =A2 = 0
it follows that
A3 = µ− r = rΣR
(
Cbθ −Dbβ θη
)
. (6.24)
Note that Cb−Db = ρρ¯ρ+ρ¯ . Thus, the previous equation can be rewritten as
A3 = µ− r = rΣR
(
ρρ¯
ρ+ρ¯ θ +Db(θ −β θη)
)
. (6.25)
Recalling the definition of A3 from (2.14), (6.25) yields
a0 =
1
r
κ p p¯ap+
1
r
(κe)′e¯ae− ρρ¯ρ+ρ¯ΣRθ −DbΣR(θ −β θη). (6.26)
Plugging (6.16), (6.17), and Cb−Db = ρρ¯ρ+ρ¯ back to (6.4), we confirm (3.19). Left-multiplying
both sides of (6.25) by θ ′, we obtain the excess return of the portfolio:
θ ′(µ− r) = r ρρ¯ρ+ρ¯Varθ + rDb
(
Varθ − (Covarθ ,η )2Varη
)
. (6.27)
Left-multiplying η ′ both sides of (6.25) by η ′ , we obtain the excess return of the index:
η ′(µ− r) = r ρρ¯ρ+ρ¯Covarθ ,η . (6.28)
Finally, since api and aei obtained in (6.23) are positive, all entries of ΣR are positive. Moreover
all entries of η are positive. Therefore η ′ΣRη > 0 is also confirmed.
9Equation (6.22) remains the same when Principal chooses nonzero index investment, i.e., y 6= 0. For any y,
Principal can control variables Γ¯GI + y and U¯ − y for the maxmization problem in (6.7). Then, equations (6.11),
(6.12), and (6.18) remain valid when Γ¯GI , U¯ , and Y ∗ are replaced by Γ¯GI + y, U¯ − y, and Y ∗ + yη , respectively.
Moreover, equation (6.22) follows from the market clearing condition Y ∗+ yη = θ .
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6.5.2 Step 2: Participation constraint and Principal’s value
We now determine Principal’s optimal choice of Agent’s value at time 0, i.e., V¯0, so that Agent is
willing to take this contract. and that Principal is willing to issue the contract F .
If Agent does not take the contract, his value function V¯ u is expected to satisfy the following
HJB equation
δ¯V¯ u = sup
c¯u,Y
{
uA(c¯u)+V¯ uw¯(rw¯+Y
′(µ− r)− c¯u)+ 12V¯ uw¯w¯Y ′ΣRY
}
, (6.29)
We conjecture that V¯ u takes the form
V¯ u(w¯) = K¯ue−rρ¯w¯,
for some constant K¯u < 0. The first order conditions for the maximization of c¯u and Y give
c¯u =− 1ρ¯ log(−rρ¯K¯u)+ rw¯,
Y = 1rρ¯Σ
−1
R (µ− r),
which are optimizers for the right-hand side of (6.29) due to concavity. Plugging above c¯u and Y
back to (6.29) yields
log(−rρ¯K¯u) = r−δ¯r − 12r (µ− r)′Σ−1R (µ− r). (6.30)
An argument similar to the proof of Lemma 3.2 verifies the optimality of (c¯u,Y ). Since W¯0 = 0,
Principal can set V¯0 = K¯u. In this case, Agent is indifferent with respect to taking the contract or
not, in which case we assume he chooses to work for Principal. Plugging (6.30) into (6.21) yields
C = 12r
1
ρ¯ (µ− r)′Σ−1R (µ− r)− (ZY ∗+Uη)′(µ− r)
− r2ζ (Y ∗−βY
∗
I)′ΣR(Y ∗−βY ∗I)+ r2 ρ¯(ZY ∗+Uη)′ΣR(ZY ∗+Uη).
(6.31)
Let us determine K in (6.6). First, plugging µ−r from (6.24) into the right-hand side of (6.30),
we obtain
log(−rρ¯V¯0) = r−δ¯r − r2
[
C 2b Var
θ +(D2b −2CbDb) (Covar
θ ,η )2
Varη
]
. (6.32)
Second, plugging (6.11) back into (6.10) and using Y ∗ = θ , we obtain
1
ρ¯ log(−rρ¯V¯0)+ 1ρ log(−rρK)+θ ′(µ−r) = 1ρ + 1ρ¯ − δrρ − δ¯rρ¯ + r2CbVarθ− r2Db (Covar
θ ,η )2
Varη . (6.33)
Plugging (6.27) and (6.32) back to (6.33), we obtain
1
ρ log(−rρK) = 1ρ − δrρ + r2 1ρ¯ (C 2b − ρ¯Cb)Varθ + r2 1ρ¯ (D2b −2CbDb+ ρ¯Db) (Covar
θ ,η )2
Varη . (6.34)
If Principal does not hire Agent, her value function V u is expected to satisfy the following HJB
equation
δV u = sup
cu,y
{
up(cu)+V uw(rw+ yη
′(µ− r)− cu)+ 12V uwwy2η ′ΣRη
}
. (6.35)
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We conjecture that V u takes the form
V u(w) = Kue−rρw,
for some constant Ku < 0. The first order conditions for the maximization of cu and y give
cu =− 1ρ log(−rρKu)+ rw,
y = 1rρ
η ′(µ−r)
η ′ΣRη ,
which are optimizers for the right-hand side of (6.35) due to concavity. Plugging above cu and y
back to (6.35), we obtain
1
ρ log(−rρKu) = 1ρ − δrρ − 12r 1ρ (η
′(µ−r))2
η ′ΣRη . (6.36)
Using η ′(µ− r) from (6.28), we obtain
1
ρ log(−rρKu) = 1ρ − δrρ − r2 1ρ
( ρρ¯
ρ+ρ¯
)2 (Covarθ ,η )2
Varη . (6.37)
An argument similar to the proof of Lemma 3.2 verifies the optimality of (cu,y).
Comparing (6.34) and (6.37), we see that V (W0)≥V u(W0) if and only if
C3Varθ +C4
(Covarθ ,η )2
Varη ≥ r2
( ρρ¯
ρ+ρ¯
)2 (Covarθ ,η )2
Varη , (6.38)
where constants C3 and C4 are
C3 = r2
ρ
ρ¯Cb(ρ¯−Cb) and C4 = r2 ρρ¯Db(2Cb−Db− ρ¯).
Note that C3 = r2
( ρρ¯
ρ+ρ¯ )
2−C4 and C3 ≥ 0 when 0 ≤ b ≤ 1. Then, (6.38) is equivalent to Varθ ≥
(Covarθ ,η )2
Varη , which holds by Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Therefore, V (W0)≥V u(W0) and Principal
is willing to hire Agent.
6.6 Calculation for Figure 4
Given the excess return in BVW (2014)
µ− r = rρ¯ΣR(Zθ +Uη), (6.39)
where Z and U are as in Theorem 3.5 item (a), and Agent’s optimal holding Y ∗ = θ , Principal’s
value function is
VBVW (W0) =−e−rρW0−CBVW ,
where
CBVW =−1+ δr + log(rρ)− r2
( ρρ¯
ρ+ρ¯
)2θ ′ΣRθ
− rρ(b− ρρ+ρ¯ )+[ ρ¯2ρ+ρ¯ − (ρ¯+ 12ρ)(b− ρρ+ρ¯ )+](Varθ − (Covarη ,θ )2Varη ). (6.40)
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The term log(rρ) in above eqaution corresponds to the term log(r) in BVW (2014), Equation
(A.104). The difference is due to Principal’s utility being equal to −e−ρc in BVW (2014), while
being equal to − 1ρ e−ρc in the present paper.
Taking the excess return (6.39), we want to calculate Principal’s value if she uses our contract.
First, (6.39) yields
η ′(µ− r) = r ρρ¯ρ+ρ¯Covarη ,θ , α = rρ¯(Zθ +Uη).
Plugging above two identities back into (6.4), and using Γ¯G and Γ¯GI from (6.16) and (6.17), we
obtain
Y ∗ =
ρ¯Z
Cb
θ +
Db− ρ¯(b− ρρ+ρ¯ )+
Cb
β θη . (6.41)
Using the above expression and the fact that Cb =
ρρ¯
ρ+ρ¯ +Db, we have
CovarY
∗,η =Covarθ ,η .
Hence (6.11) yields
U¯ = ρ−(ρ+ρ¯)Z(ρ+ρ¯)Z β
θ .
Plugging the previous expression of U¯ back into (6.10), a calculation shows that
1
ρ¯ log(−rρ¯V¯0)+ 1ρ log(−rρK)+(Y ∗)′(µ− r) = 1ρ + 1ρ¯ − δrρ − δ¯rρ¯ + r2CbVarY
∗− r2Db (Covar
η ,Y∗)2
Varη .
Combining (6.39), (6.41), and the fact that Cb =
ρρ¯
ρ+ρ¯ +Db, we show that
r
2
CbVarY
∗− r
2
Db
(Covarη ,Y
∗
)2
Varη
=
1
2
(Y ∗)′(µ− r)
=
r
2
ρ¯2Z2
Cb
Varθ +
r
2
−ρ¯(b− ρρ+ρ¯ )+Cb+ ρ¯ZDb− ρ¯2(b− ρρ+ρ¯ )+Z
Cb
(Covarθ ,η)2
Varη
.
On the other hand, using (6.30), (6.39), and K¯u = V¯0, we obtain
log(−rρ¯V¯0) = 1− δ¯r −
r
2
ρ¯2Z2Varθ − r
2
[
−2Z(b− ρρ+ρ¯ )+ρ¯2+(b− ρρ+ρ¯ )2+ρ¯2
](Covarθ ,η)2
Varη
.
Combining the previous three equations, Principal’s value, when she employs the contract in
(3.17), is
VCX(W0) = Ke−rρW0 =−e−rρW0−CCX ,
where
CCX =−1+ δr + log(rρ)
+
r
2
ρρ¯Z2
Cb
[
ρ¯2
ρ+ρ¯ − (ρ+ ρ¯)
(
b− ρρ+ρ¯
)2
+
]
Varθ
+
r
2
[
ρρ¯
ρ+ρ¯ (ρ− ρ¯)
(
b− ρρ+ρ¯
)
+
+ρρ¯
(
b− ρρ+ρ¯
)2
+
+
ρρ¯Z
Cb
(
Db− ρ¯
(
b− ρρ+ρ¯
)
+
)](Covarθ ,η)2
Varη
.
(6.42)
Figure 4 compares the certainty equivalences CBVW/ρ and CCX/ρ for Principal under the two
contracts.
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6.7 Proofs for Section 4
6.7.1 Proof of Lemma 4.1
Let us first motivate the contract form (4.2) from the martingale principle. Given FG,I-adapted
processes Z,U,ΓG,ΓI,ΓGI such that Z ≥ b, ΓG 6= 0, and ΓG− 12rρ¯Z2 < 0, consider a contract
dFt = ZtdGt +UtdIt + 12Γ
G
t d〈G〉t + 12Γtd〈I〉t +ΓGIt d〈G, I〉t− H¯tdt,
where H¯ will be determined as follows. Suppose that Agent’s continuation value is given by
V¯t = V¯0e−rρ¯W¯t ,
where W¯ is as in (4.1). It is expected from the martingale principle that the process V˜t = e−δ¯ tV¯t +∫ t
0 e
−δ¯ suA(c¯s)ds is a supermartingale for arbitrary strategy Ξ = (c¯,m,Y,Y¯ ), and it is a martingale
for the optimal strategy. Itoˆ’s formula implies that the drift of V˜ (divided throughout by e−δ¯ tXt) is
δ¯
rρ¯ +
uA(c¯)
X + rW¯ +bm− c¯+ Y¯ ′(µ− r)+ZY ′(µ− r)−Zm+Uη ′(µ− r)
+ 12Γ
GY ′ΣRY + 12Γ
Iη ′ΣRη+ΓGIY ′ΣRη− 12rρ¯(ZY +Uη+ Y¯ )′ΣR(ZY +Uη+ Y¯ )− H¯,
where X = −rρ¯V¯ . This drift being negative for all strategies and zero for some strategy implies
that
H¯ = sup
m,Y,Y¯ ,c¯
{
δ¯
rρ¯ +
uA(c¯)
X + rW¯ +bm− c¯+ Y¯ ′(µ− r)+ZY ′(µ− r)−Zm+Uη ′(µ− r)
+ 12Γ
GY ′ΣRY + 12Γ
Iη ′ΣRη+ΓGIY ′ΣRη− 12rρ¯(ZY +Uη+ Y¯ )′ΣR(ZY +Uη+ Y¯ )
}
= δ¯rρ¯ +
1
ρ¯ log(−rρ¯V¯0)− 1ρ¯
+ sup
Y,Y¯
{
(ZY +Uη+ Y¯ )′(µ− r)+ 12ΓGY ′ΣRY + 12ΓIη ′ΣRη+ΓGIY ′ΣRη
− 12rρ¯(ZY +Uη+ Y¯ )′ΣR(ZY +Uη+ Y¯ )
}
.
Given that ΓG− 12rρ¯Z2 < 0, the optimization problem above is concave. Then the optimizers Y ∗
and Y¯ ∗ satisfy the first order conditions
Y ∗ =− Z
ΓG− rρ¯Z2Σ
−1
R (µ− r)−
ΓGI− rρ¯ZU
ΓG− rρ¯Z2 η+
rρ¯Z
ΓG− rρ¯Z2 Y¯
∗, (6.43)
ZY ∗+Uη+ Y¯ ∗ = 1rρ¯Σ
−1(µ− r), (6.44)
whose solutions are given in (4.4). Suppose the transversality condition (2.7) is satisfied when
Agent employs the strategy Ξ∗. The optimality of Ξ∗ follows from a proof similar to Lemma 3.2.
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6.7.2 Proof of Theorem 4.2
When Agent employs the optimal strategy Ξ∗, combining (4.2), (6.43), and (6.44), we get
dFt =
[
− δ¯rρ¯ − 1ρ¯ log(−rρ¯V¯0)+ 1ρ¯ − (Y¯ ∗t )′(µ− r)+ 12 1rρ¯ (µ− r)′Σ−1R (µ− r)
]
dt
+(ZtY ∗t +Utηt)
′(γdBpt +σdBet ).
The Principal’s wealth process then follows
dWt =(rWt− ct)dt+(Y ∗t )′dRt + ytdIt−dFt
=
[
rWt− ct + δ¯rρ¯ + 1ρ¯ log(−rρ¯V¯0)− 1ρ¯
]
dt+(Y ∗t + ytη+ Y¯
∗
t )
′(µ− r)dt
− 12 1rρ¯ (µ− r)′Σ−1R (µ− r)dt+
[
(Y ∗+ yη)− (ZY ∗+Uη)]′(γdBpt +σdBet ).
We conjecture that Principal’s value function takes the form V (W ) = Ke−rρW for some constant
K < 0. Then V satisfies the following HJB equation
r−δ = sup
Z≥b,U,Γ′s
{
ρ
ρ¯ (δ¯ − r)+ rρ
[
(Y ∗+ yη+ Y¯ ∗)′(µ− r)+ 1ρ¯ log(−rρ¯V¯0)+ 1ρ log(−rρK)
]
+ rρ
[− 12 1rρ¯ (µ− r)′Σ−1R (µ− r)]
− 12(rρ)2
[
(Y ∗+ yη+ Y¯ ∗)− (ZY ∗+Uη+ Y¯ ∗)]′ΣR[(Y ∗+ yη+ Y¯ ∗)− (ZY ∗+Uη+ Y¯ ∗)]},
where ZY ∗+Uη+ Y¯ ∗ is given in (6.44) and
Y ∗+ yη+ Y¯ ∗ = 1rρ¯Σ
−1(µ− r)+
[
(Z−1)ΓGIΓG − (U− y)
]
η . (6.45)
Using (6.44), we observe that the right-hand side of the HJB equation is a maximization problem
in terms of Y ∗+yη+Y¯ ∗. Denoting A = (Z−1)ΓGIΓG − (U−y) and using (6.44), this maximization
problem becomes equivalent to
sup
Z≥b,U,Γ′s
{
ρ+ρ¯
ρ¯
[ 1
rρ¯Σ
−1
R (µ−r)+Aη
]′
(µ−r)− 12rρ
[ 1
rρ¯Σ
−1
R (µ−r)+Aη
]′ΣR[ 1rρ¯Σ−1R (µ−r)+Aη]}.
Instead of optimizing over Z ≥ b,U , and Γ′s, we optimize over A to obtain the optimizer
A = 1rρ
η ′(µ−r)
η ′ΣRη .
Therefore any optimizers Z,U,Γ′s satisfy (4.5). The werification for both Agent and Principal’s
optimization problems is similar to Section 6.4.4.
6.7.3 Proof of Theorem 4.3
When Agent employs the optimal strategy in (4.8) and (4.9), using (4.6), (4.7), and noticing that
(4.6) does not contain y¯ · I, we obtain
dF∗ =−
[
1
ρ¯ log(−rρ¯V¯0)+ δ¯rρ¯ − 1ρ¯ + y¯∗η ′(µ− r)− 12rρ¯(ZtY ∗t +Utη+ y¯∗η)′ΣR(ZtY ∗+Utη+ y¯∗η)
]
dt
+(ZtY ∗t +Utη)
′(γdBpt +σdBet ).
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Therefore, Principal’s wealth process follows
dWt =
[
rWt− ct + 1ρ¯ log(−rρ¯V¯0)+ δ¯rρ¯ − 1ρ¯
]
dt
+
[
(Y ∗t + ytη+ y¯
∗
t η)
′(µ− r)− 12rρ¯(ZtY ∗t +Utη+ y¯∗t η)′ΣR(ZtY ∗+Utη+ y¯∗t η)
]
dt
+
[
(Y ∗t + ytη)− (ZtY ∗t +Utη)
]′
(γdBpt +σdBet ).
We conjecture that Principal’s value function is given by
V (w) = Ke−rρw, (6.46)
for some constant K < 0. The value function is expected to satisfy the following HJB equation
δV = sup
Z≥b,U,Γ′s,c,y
{
up(c)+Vw
[
rw− c+ 1ρ¯ log(−rρ¯V¯0)+ δ¯rρ¯ − 1ρ¯
]
+Vw
[
(Y ∗+ yη+ y¯∗η)′(µ− r)− 12rρ¯(ZY ∗+Uη+ y¯∗η)′ΣR(ZY ∗+Uη+ y¯∗η)
]
+ 12Vww
[
(Y ∗+ yη)− (ZY ∗+Uη)]′ΣR[(Y ∗+ yη)− (ZY ∗+Uη)]}. (6.47)
Recalling (4.8) and (4.9), we have
Y ∗+ yη+ y¯∗η =− ZΓGα−
(ΓGI
ΓG − y
)
η− (ΓGG¯ΓG −1)y¯∗η ,
ZY ∗+Uη+ y¯∗η = Z(Y ∗+ yη+ y¯∗η)+(U−Zy− (Z−1)y¯∗)η ,
(Y ∗+ yη)− (ZY ∗+Uη) = (Y ∗+ yη+ y¯∗η)− (ZY ∗+Uη+ y¯∗η),
where α = Σ−1R (µ− r). Therefore, instead of optimizing over Z,U¯ ,Γ′s, and y individually, we can
optimize over Z, ΓGI − yΓG, ΓGG¯−ΓG and U − Zy− (Z− 1)y¯∗. We rename the last three new
variables as ΓGI , ΓGG¯, and U . As a result, choosing y = y¯∗ = 0, with appropriate choice of Z,U ,
and Γ′s, the right-hand side of (6.47) remains the same. Writing (4.8) and (4.9) in terms of these
new variables and using y = y¯∗ = 0, we obtain
Y ∗ =− Z
ΓG
α− Γ
GI
ΓG
η ,
y¯∗ =
ΓGG¯Z− (1−Z)ΓG
ΓGΓG¯− (ΓGG¯+ΓG)2
η ′(µ− r)
η ′ΣRη
+
ΓGI(ΓGG¯+ΓG)−ΓGΓG¯I
ΓGΓG¯− (ΓGG¯+ΓG)2 .
For given Z,ΓG,ΓGI with Z > b,ΓG < 0, we can take
ΓGG¯ = 1−ZZ Γ
G, ΓG¯ < 1Z2Γ
G, ΓG¯I = 1ZΓ
GI.
Then, ΓGΓG¯− (ΓGG¯)2 > 0 and y¯∗ = 0 are satisfied. This reduces to the case in which Agent is not
allowed to invest in the index privately. Hence, the remainder of the proof is the same as before.
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